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Abstract 
 
Economic policies are almost never pursued for purely economic reasons; however 
politicians find justification for the majority of their actions in economics. Political intentions 
are thus often the cause for careless budget management and eventually lead to political 
budget cycles. This study aims to contribute to the literature on political budget cycles by 
assessing the existence of political budget cycles induced by the manipulation of budget 
composition. Moreover, we aim at studying the impact of fiscal rules on the occurrence of this 
phenomenon. In order to achieve this, our analysis was based on 14 Economic and Monetary 
Union Member Countries and covered the period of 1991-2007. We found no evidence of 
electoral cycles in budget deficits, but found instead that these cycles occur at disaggregated 
expenditures and revenue categories. Moreover, evidence showed that these cycles are more 
predominant in expenditures and in more “visible” categories, namely Social Transfers, 
Employee Compensation, and Direct Taxes. Even though the fiscal rules indicator does not 
display significant effects on its own in these categories (except in Social Transfers), it does 
help mitigate (accentuate) the electoral effect when its value is high (low) enough. 
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Resumo 
 
Raras são as vezes em que políticas económicas são implementadas por motivos 
puramente económicos. No entanto, os governantes justificam as suas ações com base em 
princípios económicos. As intenções políticas levam assim, usualmente, a uma gestão 
orçamental descuidada e consequentemente ao surgimento de ciclos políticos orçamentais. 
Este estudo pretende contribuir para a literatura dos ciclos políticos orçamentais através da 
averiguação da sua existência pela manipulação da composição orçamental. Pretende-se ainda 
estudar o impacto que a existência de regras orçamentais apresenta para este fenómeno. Para 
tal, baseou-se a análise em 14 Estados-Membros da União Económica e Monetária no período 
de 1991 a 2007. Não foram encontradas evidências de ciclos eleitorais em termos de défices 
orçamentais. Contudo, verificou-se que estes ciclos ocorrem ao nível da desagregação das 
categorias de Receitas e Despesas. Verificou-se ainda que estes ciclos são mais predominantes 
em termos de Despesas e em categorias mais “visíveis” ao eleitorado, nomeadamente 
Transferências Sociais, Despesas com Pessoal e Impostos Diretos. Apesar de o indicador de 
regras orçamentais (FRI) não apresentar efeitos significativos de forma independente (exceto 
nas Transferências Sociais), este indicador tem um efeito mitigador (acentuador) do efeito 
eleitoral quando o seu valor é elevado (reduzido) o suficiente. 
 
 
 
 
Palavras chave: ciclos políticas orçamentais, política orçamental, regras orçamentais, 
composição orçamental, EMU. 
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1. Introduction 
Currently, the fields of Economics and Politics display a considerable level of 
interdependency. Economic policies are almost never pursued for purely economic 
reasons but, still, politicians find justification for the majority of their actions in 
economics. As referred by Mierau et al. (2007), the 1970s witnessed a large and 
unprecedented peacetime growth of several OECD countries’ public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
which lead these countries to adopt fiscal adjustment programs. However, this raised the 
question as to why this phenomenon took place. One of many possible answers put 
forward is the existence of political business cycles. According to this suggestion, 
countries displayed high levels of indebtedness due to governments’ political 
preferences and need for reelection. 
Since Nordhaus’ (1975) approach to the concept of political cycles, literature 
has evolved considerably and has, since then, become more disperse and covers now a 
wide range of different topics. This study aims to contribute to one of the more recent 
strands in Political Economy literature – that of arguing the existence of political budget 
cycles induced by the manipulation of budget composition rather than through the 
management of revenues or expenditures as a whole. In other words, this study intends 
to verify the occurrence of political budget cycles that do not result in the deterioration 
of government deficit, but that are, instead, a result from governments’ choice to shift 
towards some categories of expenditure and/or revenue. 
This study also intends to evaluate the impact of fiscal rules on the occurrence of 
this type of political budget cycles. According to the European Commission
1
, 
 
“fiscal rules set numerical targets for budgetary aggregates” and “pose a 
permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary 
indicator of fiscal outcomes, such as the government budget balance, debt, 
expenditure, or revenue developments”. 
 
Hence, fiscal constraints should be sufficient to deter aggregate manipulations of 
government expenditures and revenues and should therefore reduce political budget 
                                                 
1
 Information obtained at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/fiscal_rules/index_en.htm 
(accessed on December 15, 2013). 
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cycles (or at least, their magnitude). The question is: if given these restraints and the 
incentives of governments to secure their reelection, will governments manipulate 
budget composition at a more disaggregate level? And if so, which target budget 
categories will be manipulated to alter the composition of the budget without violating 
fiscal rules? Are there certain types of fiscal rules more efficient than others in deterring 
governments from incurring in fiscal cycles? 
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is an example of a group of 
countries voluntarily bounded by common, as well as country-specific, fiscal rules and 
is therefore an interesting case to study. Countries of the EMU are subject to rules 
established in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP); even though this pact is applicable 
to all European Union Member States, it has stricter enforcement mechanisms for 
members of the Eurozone. Among other rules, the SGP imposes reference values for 
national budget deficits (at 3% of GDP) and public debt (at 60% of GDP). If EMU 
Member States violate these rules, sanctions are imposed. These sanctions are only 
applicable to Eurozone countries and are, thus, an example of enforcement mechanisms. 
This dissertation aims to be a valuable contribution to the existing literature by 
not only reviewing the literature on budget composition political budget cycles and its 
empirical results, but also by analyzing if the EMU Member Countries’ experience in 
terms of occurrence, magnitude and budget composition of political budget cycles was 
altered after joining the EMU, due to more stringent fiscal rules. Another interesting 
aspect would be to understand if there are specific types of fiscal rules that are more 
efficient in managing electoral cycles. 
The empirical approach is inspired by the standard literature and employs the 
Fixed Effects Method to estimate the effect of electoral, political, demographic and 
fiscal variables on fiscal categories. The panel comprises data on the “nuclear” 
Economic and Monetary Union Member States between 1991 and 2007, in order to 
exclude observations during the most recent financial crises. The analysis is then 
extended by firstly including a simple coefficient comparison between regressions for 
each fiscal variable with and without the consideration of each type of fiscal rule, and 
then introducing fiscal rule and election dummy interaction terms. 
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the historical 
context of political business cycles literature and its evolution towards fiscal cycles and 
 3 
political cycles in budget composition. This section also provides an overview of 
numerical fiscal rules in the Economic and Monetary Union and surveys empirical 
literature and its main results. Section 3 describes the methodology, the data and the 
obtained empirical results from our empirical application to the EMU countries. Section 
4 concludes. 
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2. From Political Business Cycles to budget composition 
manipulation 
2.1. Political Business Cycles 
As Tufte (1978) states (cfr. Chang, 2008, p. xi): 
 
“The single most important fact about politicians is that they are elected. The 
second is that they usually seek reelection.” 
 
 In order to be reelected, governments are tempted to pursue public policies that 
are perceived to generate higher levels of public well-being. Governments would 
therefore stimulate the economy and attempt to maximize votes by 
improving/influencing economic outcomes. This phenomenon has come to be known as 
political business cycles. According to Shi and Svensson (2003), political business 
cycles are a result from the interaction between elections and real economy outcomes, 
particularly inflation and unemployment rates. 
Nordhaus (1975) was the first author to formalize a model describing a political 
business cycle. His pioneer study considered a setting in which the economy can be 
described by an exploitable Phillips curve where voters form backward-looking 
expectations; hence, the number of votes depends on recent economic outcomes, such 
as inflation and unemployment rates. In this model it was also assumed that 
governments did not display partisan differences, their sole objective being to secure 
reelection, and that governments could manipulate (monetary) policy instruments in 
order to stimulate aggregate demand and influence the inflation rate. The author thus 
postulated that governments would exploit the Phillips curve by conducting 
expansionary monetary policies which would diminish the economy’s unemployment 
rate and improve voters’ (perceived) well-being.  
Relying on both theoretical and empirical grounds, Nordhaus’ model was highly 
criticized. For instance, the fundamental assumption that the governments are able to 
exert control over monetary policy is not consistent with the central bank independence 
hypothesis. The rational expectations revolution showed that there were other flaws in 
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Nordhaus’ (1975) formulation, such as the fact that the author assumed voters behaving 
backward-looking matter when forming expectations and assessing the governments’ 
competence. Moreover, the fact that fiscal policy was not taken into consideration was 
also criticized. 
In 1977, Hibbs presented his view on the political business cycle and developed 
the partisan model, also based on an exploitable Phillips curve in which, unlike in 
Nordhaus’ (1975) model, different parties display different macroeconomic goals and 
preferences. In this case, a government’s objective is not only to be reelected, but also 
to maximize its party’s economic preferences. Following empirics, the model assumes 
that parties on the left wing tend to penalize higher levels of unemployment and thus 
prefer to bear the cost of high inflation rates. On the other hand, parties on the right 
wing tend to be more conservative and prefer lower inflation rates. Consequently, left-
wing governments will pursue more expansionist monetary policies. According to the 
author, the macroeconomic fluctuations one observes in the economy are mainly driven 
by government partisan preferences in terms of inflation and unemployment rates. 
During elections, voters intend to elect governments closer to their personal economic 
preferences. However, Hibbs’ (1977) model was subject to the same line of criticisms as 
Nordhaus’ (1975). 
Given the problems identified in both aforementioned models, these were 
revisited and reformulated after the rational expectations revolution. These new models 
incorporated voter rationality by taking into account how voters formed expectations 
about future policy and how they would act upon those expectations through elections. 
The existence of opportunistic electoral manipulation despite voter rationality is 
justified through the concepts of “imperfect information” regarding the competence of 
governments and “uncertainty” (Drazen, 2001).  
The partisan perspective was reformulated by Alesina (1987) and the rational 
partisan model was developed. The author argued that political business cycles arise 
only when the electoral outcome and the inflation rate are uncertain. The expected 
inflation rates are directly determined by the winning party; if there is certainty 
regarding the winning party, there is no cycle. Under uncertainty, if the elections are 
won by a left-wing party, there is a positive surprise regarding inflation and there is a 
decrease in the unemployment rate. Then again, if a right-wing party is elected, there is 
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a negative surprise concerning the inflation rate and there is a rise in the unemployment 
rate. Consequently, the magnitude of the cycle is determined by the level of electoral 
uncertainty and the differences between the targets for the inflation rate of each party. 
Rogoff’s (1990) rational opportunistic model assumed that voters form rational 
expectations regarding the inflation rate but that, at the time they form these 
expectations, available information is rather incomplete. In particular, voters have no 
information regarding the government’s competence (their ability to combine low rates 
of both unemployment and inflation). The author suggests that governments in function 
have an incentive to explore the information asymmetry regarding their competence. 
Thus, political business cycles would therefore result from government’s attempts to 
signal their competence to the voters.  
A lack of empirical evidence regarding real effects in the economy combined 
with an 
 
“implausibility of key assumptions” (Drazen, 2001, p. 76) 
 
and the inability on behalf of the policymakers to directly affect these outcomes 
rendered the concept of political business cycles purely theoretical, as put by Drazen 
(2001, p. 77): 
 
“… models based on manipulating the economy via monetary policy are 
unconvincing both theoretically and empirically, while explanations based on fiscal 
policy conform much better to the data and form a stronger basis for a convincing 
theoretical model of electoral effects on economic outcomes.” 
 
2.2. Political Budget Cycles 
More recent strands of literature evolved towards the concept of political budget 
cycles. The inability to control economic outcomes, partly due to the adoption of 
independent central banks, forces governments to adopt expansionary fiscal policies 
(either increasing public spending or cutting taxes) in order to achieve their ultimate 
goal of reelection, thus creating political budget cycles (Schneider, 2010). These differ 
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from political business cycles in the sense that governments do not try to manipulate 
economic outcomes but rather induce cycles by influencing fiscal variables such as 
public spending, taxes and budget deficits (de Haan and Klomp, 2013). Further, 
according to Efthyvoulou (2012), political budget cycles describe a phenomenon in 
which fiscal policies differ pre- and post-electorally due to governments’ opportunistic 
behavior. Contrary to the seminal contributions, this next generation of models 
accounted for the fact that fiscal policy could also be used to enhance governments’ 
advantage and highlighted the role of information asymmetries. 
 Several authors tried to ascertain the existence of political budget cycles and the 
general empirical conclusion is that these phenomena are not unconditional, meaning 
that they occur in specific samples of countries.  
Schuknecht (1996) was among the first authors to examine the existence of 
electorally induced fiscal policies in developing countries. Employing an annual panel 
of data regarding 35 developing countries in the period between 1972 and 1992 the 
author tests several hypotheses. Firstly, the author tests for overall fiscal deficit 
increases in electoral years and predicts that in developing countries it should be easier 
(and more easily observable) for governments to increase expenditures rather than to 
decrease taxes, as in these countries the tax base is rather small. This hypothesis is 
confirmed by the empirical results, which suggest that the electoral effect is 
considerable (almost 0.7 percent of GDP). Results further indicate that this effect is 
much larger in less trade-oriented countries (almost 1% of GDP), as predicted by the 
author. Finally, the author considers the effect of IMF-supported programs on fiscal 
deficits. These programs promote economic stabilization and fiscal consolidation and 
encompass greater budget constraints in countries, which would ultimately lead to 
smaller fiscal deficits, even in the short-term. Due to these countries’ small public sector 
and rather large informal sector, the recessionary effect of fiscal consolidation should be 
mitigated. Again, the results confirm the author’s hypothesis and show that these 
programs improve the fiscal balance. 
For example, Shi and Svensson 2006) tried to determine whether there were 
differences in terms of magnitude and occurrence of political cycles between 
industrialized and developing countries. Their study included data from 85 countries 
(both developed and developing) during the period of 1975-1995. Results indicated that 
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political budget cycles do occur and that, on average, government deficit (as a share of 
GDP) increased by almost 1 percentage point in election years; this means that, on 
average, fiscal deficit increased by 22% in election years. However, by dividing the 
sample, a second regression indicated that political budget cycles in developing 
countries were much larger. The study showed that the average developing country 
experienced a 1.3 percentage points worsening of its fiscal balance in election years, 
whereas this decrease in the average developed country was only by 0.1 percentage 
points. The authors suggested that such diverging results were due to institutional 
features as those, for instance, that imposed constraints on politicians (in developed 
countries), barely leaving room for government fiscal manipulation. 
Following these results, Brender and Drazen (2005) tried to understand whether 
the political budget cycles found in these large cross-sections of countries were due to 
the presence of “new democracies” in the sample. The authors believed that contrary to 
established democracies, new democracies may experience political budget cycles as 
the voters are not accustomed to electoral politics or possibly lack the ability to 
correctly distinguish fiscal manipulation. In their study, the authors used data from a 68-
country sample covering the period 1960-2001 and ran several regressions. First, they 
tested a sample with several developed countries and then proceeded to remove four 
new democracies (Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey) to find that, in the second 
regression, the fiscal budget cycle disappeared. They then proceeded to do the same 
with less-developed countries and again concluded that the significant deficit cycle in 
the complete sample was due to the presence of new democracies.  
2.3. Moral hazard model 
More recently, the literature evolved and started to consider the importance of 
(temporary) information asymmetries between voters and politicians regarding the 
competence of the latter in explaining political budget cycles. These models were 
inspired by Rogoff’s (1990), which suggested that competence signaling could be 
obtained by turning to easily observed spending categories while cutting back on other 
expenses, and lead to the development of moral hazard models (instead of adverse 
selection). As argued by Shi and Svensson (2003), in moral hazard models perceived 
competence is proxied by the government’s productivity (the ability to produce more 
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public goods with the same revenue), while in adverse selection models the competence 
level is unknown both to politicians and voters. 
Shi and Svensson (2006), building on the work of Persson and Tabellini (2000), 
developed a moral hazard model to explain differences in political budget cycles 
between developed and developing countries which highlighted the incumbent 
government’s ability to manipulate policy instruments in order to bias voters’ 
preferences. To increase his chances of reelection he attempts to signal his competence 
to the voters (through the supply of public goods). All politicians share the same 
incentive, which depends on the politico-institutional environment. The more private 
gains politicians earn when in power and/or the greater the share of voters unable to 
detect pre-electoral manipulations, the stronger their incentives to signal their 
competence. The authors’ empirical study showed that, on average, countries with more 
rent-seeking activities (higher levels of fiscal manipulation) had larger electoral budget 
cycles. Results also showed that a greater share of informed voters lead to smaller 
political budget cycles. Constraints imposed on developed countries’ politicians and the 
higher level of informed voters in these countries lead to smaller political budget cycles, 
when compared with developing countries. 
2.4. Fiscal conservatism  
Increasing government expenses or reducing revenues and therefore creating a 
deficit in election years may not always lead to the expected increase in votes. Peltzman 
(1992) was among the first to argue that voters punish increases in government 
spending and that 
 
“Basically, every extra dollar is equally bad.” (Peltzman, 1992, p. 329). 
 
More recently, authors such as Drazen and Eslava (2010) showed that voters are 
“fiscal conservatives” and that, as suggested by Peltzman (1992), an increase in 
government deficit may in fact harm the incumbent’s chance of being reelected. 
According to this, one might then argue that political budget cycles couldn’t exist since 
governments would lose their incentive for electoral manipulation. 
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Brender and Drazen (2005) found evidence of larger budget cycles in new 
democracies. Naturally, the authors tried to understand why these differences existed. 
They believed that these might be due to factors such as the availability of political and 
economic information to the voters and their ability to interpret it, access to media 
(which would give access to this information) and experience (or lack thereof) with 
elections. In new democracies there is generally less information available to the 
electorate. These factors, combined with the lack of experience with elections, render 
most voters unable to correctly identify fiscal manipulation, which are thus more likely 
to “reward” election-year deficits. Brender (2003), cfr. Brender and Drazen (2005), 
illustrated this explanation. The author found evidence of a shift in electoral response to 
election-year deficits in local Israeli elections. When the elections were first introduced, 
voters were unconcerned with deficits. By the time reporting standards were introduced 
and media grew, local voters began punishing deficits. The aforementioned authors 
argued that their results combined two opposing ideas regarding pre-electoral 
manipulation: on the one hand they confirm that politicians will engage in fiscal 
manipulation, but on the other they also support the fact that fiscal budget cycles occur 
regardless of the existence of fiscal conservatives, since their findings indicated that in 
new democracies voters may reward election-year deficits and punish them in 
established economies. 
The premise by which voters respond directly to electoral policy and thus 
penalize government incurring in deficits was empirically explored by Drazen and 
Eslava (2010) who looked at data from Colombian mayoral elections in the period 
between 1992 and 2000. The authors defined the share of votes obtained by either party 
(Liberal and Conservative) as a function of preelection fiscal policy choices by the 
incumbent party. The empirical results corroborated the initial premise: voters penalize 
incumbents that run high deficits  
However, recent studies (e.g., Kneebone and McKenzie, 2001 and Drazen and 
Eslava, 2010) take the existence of fiscal rules into consideration and argue that these 
might influence governments to manipulate the budget at a more disaggregate level 
instead of the overall budget for political gains. Tsai (2014) poses the question as such: 
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“… could speculative politicians manipulate spending within disaggregated 
public expenditure categories for electoral gains? Or do binding balanced 
budget requirements limit such manipulation?” (Tsai, 2014, p. 59). 
 
The same author considers that the incentive to influence voters by manipulating 
government budget at a disaggregated level allows for government opportunistic 
behavior without disregarding the assumption of voter rationality (Tsai, 2014). The 
literature proceeded to analyze the topic of political budget cycles induced by the 
manipulation of the disaggregated budget.  
2.5. A new moral hazard model and composition cycles 
Keeping in mind that voters are “fiscal conservatives”, another moral hazard 
model was developed by Drazen and Eslava (2010) as to model situations in which 
governments attempt to signal their competence by changing government spending 
composition instead of global revenues or spending. In this model, the authors consider 
a two-period framework and an election between the incumbent and a challenger at the 
end of the first period. According to the model, the incumbents can only alter the 
composition of the budget and not its overall level. Therefore, incumbents may use the 
composition of the budget (and particularly expenditures) to attract votes. It is assumed 
that all voters share the same budget composition preference, so there is only 
heterogeneity between voters and politicians. In the decision of which candidate to 
support, voters face a trade-off between ideology over non-fiscal policy and utility from 
targeted expenditures. Moreover, politicians are bound by a budget constraint since 
there are goods that are valued by politicians but not by voters.  
According to the authors, voters value some types of spending more than others. 
An incumbent can try to signal his competence by shifting the composition of 
government spending towards voters’ preferences. This opportunistic shift in 
government expenditures towards more “visible” categories is referred to as: “pork 
barrel spending”. Political manipulation therefore takes the form of changing the 
composition of government spending and voters can (rationally) respond to these 
spending shifts. Thus, political budget cycles may occur even if voters are fiscal 
conservatives. 
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The authors applied this model to Colombian municipalities and found that this 
shift in government spending usually means that there is a decrease in current 
expenditure before the elections (particularly through cuts in transfers to pensioners and 
payments to temporary workers) and an increase in spending related to development 
projects (such as health, water and energy infrastructures, and housing). Specifically, 
the authors discovered that spending grows by 2% and that current transfers suffer a 
decrease of about 10%, in election years. The results confirmed what the authors knew 
a priori: Colombian voters highly value infrastructure development projects as these 
investments are largely visible and beneficial to large groups of the population. 
Furthermore, the authors' results indicated that voters punish incumbents for incurring 
in high deficits. 
Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) studied Canadian provinces during the period 
of 1966-1997 in order to verify if, as predicted by Rogoff’s (1990) model, governments 
will increase spending in areas that are most visible to voters. Contrary to Rogoff 
(1990), the authors believed that the distinction should not be made in terms of current 
versus capital expenses but rather in terms of “visible” and “less visible” expenses. In 
the Canadian context, the fact that most expenditures are of shared responsibility 
between local and federal government makes it difficult for voters to attribute 
responsibility for certain expenditures and thus limits the local governments in signaling 
their competence to voters. The authors called this dimension the “identifiability” of an 
expenditure category with local government. Somewhat subjectively, the authors 
considered that 
 
“the four expenditure categories of Education, Transportation and 
Communication, Recreation and Culture, and Protection” (Kneebone and McKenzie, 
2001, p. 767) 
 
are both visible and identifiable as local government responsibilities. Evidence 
confirmed Rogoff’s model and showed opportunistic effects during election years 
across the expenditure categories, driven by a decrease in spending in less “identifiable” 
categories (such as health and industrial development) and an increase in more “visible” 
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categories such as education, transportation and communication, and recreation and 
culture. 
Another interesting contribution to this line of investigation is that of Chang 
(2008), who combines the composition aspect of political budget cycles with 
differences in electoral systems and veto players structures. The author used cross-
country data on 21 OECD countries between 1973 and 2000 and focused particularly on 
district-specific spending and social welfare spending and analyzed their connection 
with single-member district and proportional representation electoral systems. 
Following Alt and Lassen (2006), Chang (2008) theorized that political budget cycles in 
advanced economies only occur if the regression controls for a certain institutional 
feature. The empirical results support this premise as the author does not find significant 
election year effects in the regression without electoral system and veto player structure 
conditioning. The author further concludes that there is a difference in targeted spending 
in different electoral systems: under proportional representation incumbents target 
social welfare, whereas in single-member district systems the preference goes to 
localized district-specific spending. 
More recently, Efthyvoulou (2011) focused his research on Cyprus (1978-2006) 
and tried to examine the existence of political cycles in this small, open economy. The 
author’s findings, on one hand, showed that partisan effects regarding budget deficits 
had been becoming less pronounced over the years due to an increase in the level of 
globalization, even disappearing in later years of the sample as Cyprus prepared to join 
the EMU. On the other hand, as partisan effects seem to have practically disappeared, 
the increasing globalization lead to a prevalence of opportunistic effects and to stronger 
electoral cycles in more visible categories of the fiscal budget. 
2.6. The conditionality of composition cycles 
Empirical studies also explored why these cycles were so “conditional” and 
literature started to evolve towards the notion that the magnitude of political budget 
cycles might depend on countries’ institutional features. These features include factors 
such as the level of economic development, the endogeneity of election dates, age and 
level of democracy (Brender and Drazen, 2005; Shi and Svensson (2006); Klomp and 
de Haan, 2013), political rent-seeking and media access (as suggested by Shi and 
Svensson, 2006) or political factors such as fiscal transparency and political polarization 
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(Alt and Lassen, 2006; Klomp and de Haan, 2013). However, all these factors 
considered lean towards the idea that the main differentiating aspect is the level of 
development.  
2.6.1. Economic development 
Shi and Svensson (2006) considered that there was a gap in the literature 
regarding the universality of the political budget cycle phenomenon and particularly 
concerning possible differences between developed and developing countries. As 
previously mentioned, the authors concluded that there were indeed significant 
differences between the two sets of countries; developing countries tend to have larger 
budget cycles. They attributed these differences to the existence of different politico-
institutional features, such as the politicians’ rent of being in power and the share of 
informed voters, i.e., voters with the ability to distinguish political manipulation from 
governments’ competence. They constructed a moral hazard model in which the size of 
political budget cycles depends on political rent-seeking, i.e., the more the government 
benefits of remaining in power, the more prominent the electoral cycles. They analyze 
this fact by using two proxies for rents: the first one is based on a country’s corruption 
index and the other proxy is constructed with help of the International Country Risk 
Guide. Their empirical evidence supports their initial hypothesis; the electoral effect is 
much higher in countries with higher corruption levels
2
 and more rent-seeking 
activities. Further, the authors argue that the share of informed voters makes a 
tremendous difference in electoral cycles between these two groups of countries and 
assume that there are two types of voters: “informed” and “uninformed” voters. The 
“informed” voters have access to various kinds of information and can observe virtually 
every aspect of government policy. “Uninformed” voters do not have access to much 
information, nor can they observe every policy instrument. In order to proxy for this 
feature, the authors use data on access to media as well as media freedom. As expected, 
the empirical analysis concludes that the share of informed voters is indeed an important 
differentiating factor between electoral cycles in developed and developing countries; 
higher shares of informed voters conducts to smaller budget cycles. In their review of 
                                                 
2
 The electoral effect in countries with an average corruption level of developed countries is 0.1% of 
GDP. Countries with higher average corruption levels (developing countries) have an electoral effect of 
1.9% of GDP (Shi and Svensson, 2006). 
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recent literature, de Haan and Klomp (2013) refer to a finding of Alt and Rose (2009) 
which suggests that there are stronger election cycles in US states where newspaper 
access is lowest. 
Another important factor is put forward by Brender and Drazen’s (2005) analysis. 
Their data panel supports the existence of political budget cycles in a large sample of 
countries. However, the authors argue that this evidence is due to the presence of non-
democratic countries in the sample. Their reasoning behind this argument is that “old” 
and experienced democracies are less prone to fiscal cycles because their voters are not 
only better informed regarding governments’ fiscal policies, but are also more capable 
to process that information as they have far more experience as far as elections go and 
are thus less likely to reward fiscal deficits. This theory was later tested by Klomp and 
de Haan (2013) which concluded that the election effect is significantly higher in young 
democracies (countries who have been democratic for less than 20 years).  
A last factor considers that the voters’ decision making process is a crucial part of 
what determines fiscal cycles. According to Alt and Lassen (2006), fiscal transparency 
is central to this concept since it allows voters to identify fiscal manipulation. Using 
data on 19 OECD countries in the 1990s, the authors were able to find evidence of 
persistent cycles in low transparency countries, as opposed to none in high transparency 
countries.  
2.6.2. Fiscal rules 
The existence of firm fiscal frameworks and particularly fiscal rules constitutes 
another important institutional feature that greatly affects the magnitude of political 
budget cycles. Literature addressing the role of fiscal rules in the occurrence of political 
budget cycles has become increasingly relevant due to growing evidence supporting 
superior budgetary results as fiscal rules are introduced (for instance, Casals et al., 
2007). De Haan and Klomp (2013) surveyed studies that analyzed the influence of 
different factors conditioning the occurrence of political budget cycles and electoral 
budget manipulation. Their main conclusion regarding studies on the effect of fiscal 
rules is that, while there is a consensus that 
 
“…fiscal rules may reduce the electoral distortion of fiscal policy” (de Haan and 
Klomp, 2013, p. 402), 
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it is not yet clear what type of fiscal rules are most effective in terms of 
preventing political budget cycles. However, the effect of higher levels of budgetary 
transparency on the effectiveness of fiscal rules is largely agreed upon.     
Rose (2006) studied American states in 1974-1999 in order to assess if fiscal 
rules that limit or prohibit deficits, should they be thoroughly enforced, could have an 
impact on the politicians’ ability to manipulate fiscal policy for political gains. In this 
study, the fiscal rules considered were the so-called “no-carry” rules which determine 
which states are not allowed to “carry over” deficits into the next fiscal year. The author 
also took into account the fact that in states with “no-carry” rules, these are easier to 
circumvent (by borrowing) in some states than in others. First of all, results indicated 
that states with “no-carry” rules experienced weaker political business cycles than the 
others. Secondly, evidence also showed that when controlling for weak and strict “no-
carry” rules, states with strict rules had almost no change in budget balances during 
election years, whereas in states with weak “no-carry” rules the variation in budget 
balance was about half of that of states without rules. The author also concluded that in 
this sample political budget cycles were mostly driven by expenditure-side cycles. 
Ebeke and Ölçer (2013) studied another subsample of countries in order to 
investigate the existence of political budget cycles. These authors opted to study Low-
Income countries as these have weak institutions and almost non-existing transparency 
when it comes to the fiscal budget, which makes this subsample highly vulnerable to the 
manifestation of electorally-induced cycles. They considered Low-Income countries to 
be the ones that benefited from 
 
“the International Monetary Fund Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust as of 
2010” (Ebeke and Ölçer, 2013, p. 5). 
 
Their sample was composed of 68 countries, 51 of which had had at least one 
election during the period between 1990 and 2010. The authors’ main conclusions were 
that there is a decline in the overall deficit during election years (a worsening by about 1 
percentage point of GDP) but that cycles are also evident in both expenditures and tax 
revenues. Results indicated a slight decrease in government investment as a share of 
GDP in post-election years while consumption as a share of GDP showed a slight 
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increase during election years. The authors also found some evidence of increased trade 
tax collection during the election year and in the two following years. The empirical 
study also showed that the prevalence of political budget cycles was much lower not 
only in countries which have defined national fiscal rules, but also in countries which 
are subject to IMF programs. On a related note, Ebeke and Ölçer (2013) also believed 
that the manner in which governments opt to manipulate fiscal policy and consequently 
eliminate the resulting budget deficit has an important role in the potential economic 
growth of these countries due to the painful fiscal adjustment in need after the elections. 
Tsai (2014) used data from 46 American states between 1977 and 2008 in order 
to ascertain whether the existence of fiscal rules would lead to governments 
manipulating public expenditures in a disaggregated manner, shifting expenditures from 
less visible categories towards more visible ones for electoral purposes. The author’s 
empirical findings show that fiscal rules alone do not deter disaggregated budget 
manipulation, in the sense that there is some shifting from and to several categories 
prior to election. However, the empirical conclusions also show that these 
manipulations decrease as “carry over” rules become more stringent, which indicates 
that balanced budget rules are effective both at aggregate and disaggregate levels. 
Buti and van den Noord (2004) found that the “disappointing” experience of the 
EMU in terms of compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact (high deficits in 
countries like Germany, France, Italy and Portugal) was mainly due to governments’ 
incentives to run political (expansionist) fiscal policies during elections. 
Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) tried to understand if European Union Member 
States used fiscal policy for macroeconomic stabilization or for political purposes and, 
if the latter being the case, if this behavior was influenced by the Maastricht Treaty. 
They analyzed data from EU-15 (excluding Luxembourg due to data limitations) for the 
1970-1998 period. Overall, results suggested that these Member States had not been 
using fiscal policy as to create cycles during elections. The authors considered these 
results to be quite encouraging and believed these were an indication of converging 
economic policies in the Member States with the ultimate goal of forming an EMU. 
Mink and de Haan (2006) focused on Euro Area-12 countries (since these have 
more stringent fiscal rules than other EU member countries) and tried to determine 
whether, despite the existence of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), there were 
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political budget cycles in these countries, using data from 1999-2004. Their main 
conclusion was that the SGP was not sufficiently stringent to dissuade politicians from 
incurring in expansionary policies right before the elections.  
Using data on West German states from 1970 to 2003, Schneider (2010) sets out 
to understand if cycles in fiscal policies exist despite institutional constrictions such as 
numerical fiscal rules concerning deficits and the fact that voters tend to punish high 
deficits. The author’s theory suggests that while there would not exist budget or overall 
expenditures cycles, these would be apparent in visible budget items such as social 
security expenditures. Indeed, the author finds that in preelection years there is a clear 
incentive on the incumbent’s part to reduce the deficits, which clearly demonstrates an 
attempt to signal competence towards fiscally conservative voters. Further, the model 
clearly indicates a growth in social security spending in preelection year (almost 2%). 
More importantly, when controlling for the structural break in 1993 (when the 
Maastricht treaty limited the Bundesbank’s monetary policy autonomy), the model 
shows that social security expenditures grew by 4% after 1993. The empirical analysis 
lends clear support to the hypothesis that constrained incumbent policymakers will 
resource to specific expenditure policies to gain voter support.  
Efthyvoulou (2012) investigated the presence of political budget cycles in fiscal 
policy variables in the European Union-27, studied their variation over time and 
evaluated if there are cross-country differences due to institutional differences. Overall, 
results indicated that there were indeed political budget cycles present in the European 
Union. In order to assess cross-country variation the authors ran a series of tests 
controlling for several conditions, one of which was performed by dividing the sample 
into Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries. Results were interesting and indicated that 
the evidence for political budget cycles in the EU-27 was determined by the Eurozone 
countries. The authors attributed this result to the fact that countries that are not part of 
the Euro prefer a combination of fiscal and monetary measures to induce political 
business cycles. The author’s main conclusion was (as in Mink and de Haan, 2006) that 
the Stability and Growth Pact was not sufficiently strict and thus unsuccessful in 
preventing political business cycles within the European Union. 
Nerlich and Reuter (2013) surveyed literature on fiscal rules and used data on 
national fiscal frameworks for countries in the EU27 for the period 1990-2012 in order 
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to analyze the impact of different fiscal rules on fiscal discipline on a disaggregated 
level and also concluded that primary balance is significantly improved when fiscal 
rules are in place. They found that numerical fiscal rules have a stronger impact on 
budget categories of great interest from a political budget cycle perspective such as 
social benefits, employee compensation, and general public services.  
Eslava (2011) reviewed the literature concerning political explanations for the 
existence of fiscal deficits and highlighted the important role of budgetary institutions 
on fiscal outcomes. The author believes that fiscal rules should definitely lead to more 
fiscal discipline. However, the author also points out the fact that governments tend to 
circumvent the majority of these rules, engaging in “creative accounting”. Hence, rules 
that are too restraining can themselves be an incentive to circumvent the rules (Milesi-
Ferretti, 2003, cfr. Eslava, 2011). 
Even though there is no generalized consensus regarding the effect of fiscal 
rules on the occurrence of political budget cycles, the European Commission is resolute 
in consolidating the fiscal framework in EU Member States as they regard it as an 
important factor in mitigating the deficit bias.
3
 
 
2.7. EMU fiscal framework 
According to the European Commission (2010, p. 73), domestic fiscal 
frameworks are 
 
“the set of elements of the institutional policy setting that shape fiscal policy 
making at the national level. They comprise the arrangements, procedures and 
institutions governing the planning and implementation of budgetary policies.” 
 
These frameworks are composed of: numerical fiscal rules, independent fiscal 
institutions, medium-term budgetary frameworks and budgetary procedures governing 
the preparation, approval, and implementation of budget plans. Fiscal institutions, 
enforcement mechanisms and an appropriate overall institutional framework are key to 
guarantee the implementation of fiscal rules and their effectiveness. 
                                                 
3
Source:  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/index_en.htm. Accessed on July, 
5
th
 2014. 
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Among others, one of the main objectives of fiscal governance is to reduce 
short-term approaches to fiscal policy making. This aspect is particularly relevant for 
the purpose of this study as it would decrease the possibility of governments incurring 
in political cycles.  Specifically, this study focusses on the impact of numerical fiscal 
rules on the occurrence of political cycles given evidence in the literature of their 
impact on deficit bias.  
According to Kopits and Symansky’s (1998) definition (cfr. Debrun et al., 2008, 
p. 301) fiscal rules are 
 
“a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary 
indicator of fiscal performance” 
 
with the main goal of promoting budgetary discipline and macroeconomic 
stabilization. Casals (2012) considers that numerical fiscal rules have been instrumental 
in solving two problems concerning fiscal policy: the “deficit bias”, i.e., increasing 
deficits and public debt ratios in most advanced economies attributed to governments’ 
shortsightedness and the “common-pool problem”, and pro-cyclicality in fiscal policy 
with governments overspending during economic upturns.  
The Economic and Monetary Union is an exceptional public finance 
arrangement between Member States with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as fiscal 
pillar. Broadly put, the SGP sets numerical constraints for countries’ deficit-to-GDP and 
public debt-to-GDP in order to enforce balanced budgets but also to allow automatic 
stabilizers to play a role in economic upswings and downswings (Buti and van den 
Noord, 2004). Furthermore, the preventive arm of the SGP requires countries to achieve 
country-specific objectives on a medium-term (MTO’s) (European Commission, 2013). 
2.7.1. Fiscal rules in the EMU throughout time 
Fiscal rules in the European Union have experienced a positive evolution since 
1990. Since then, the number of numerical fiscal rules increased almost sixfold until 
2011, going from 13 to 77 numerical fiscal rules (Mierau and Andreu, 2014). This 
increase was mainly due to increases in the number of balance budget, debt and 
expenditure rules, as revenue rules were only introduced in 1995 and are not as 
important, in number, as the former ones. 
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Balanced budget rules are the more commonly used fiscal rules among the EU 
Member States (they account for 31 out of 77 in 2011), mainly due to the evidence 
suggesting these rules are correlated with superior budgetary results and address the 
deficit bias (Debrun et al,. 2008). Evolution is noteworthy since in 1990 there were only 
about 9 budget balance rules in the EU. (Debrun et al,. 2008). Although these rules 
entail positive effects on budget balance, they can also lead to more pro-cyclical 
policies and may thus be harmful to macroeconomic stabilization. The solution can be 
to adopt cyclically adjusted budget balance and structural fiscal rules.  
Although debt rules are less in number than balanced budget rules, in 2011 there 
were 21 debt rules (out of 77) enforced in the EU, whereas these rules were practically 
non-existent in 1990. The most common measures used in debt rules are debt service-
to-current revenue and debt-to-GDP targets. Given the latest sovereign debt crises, the 
European Commission (2010) believes this sort of rules will become increasingly 
important. One of the main issues attributed to debt rules is the fact that although 
domestic rules set targets for debt levels, these do not take the debt dynamics into 
account (Casals, 2012). 
Expenditure rules have also been increasing in the EU, from virtually non-
existent (in 1990) to almost 20 rules in 2011. These rules serve two purposes: (i) 
disciplining governments’ primary spending and (ii) the avoidance of pro-cyclical 
budgetary policies. According to these purposes and the fact that these rules focus on a 
directly controllable budget category (Casals, 2012), it is easy to understand that these 
rules may play a central role in terms of political budget cycles, in the sense that these 
rules are the most stringent and most capable in terms of deterring governments’ 
political and electoral intentions behind fiscal policies. 
Casals (2012) summarizes the features of 18 expenditure rules in the EU 
Member States: none of them are included in national constitutions, although 10 of 
them are described in legal documents. The majority of the expenditure rules defines an 
expenditure ceiling (nominal or real), other rules set target growth rates. 
Revenue rules are the least common rules in the EU Member States and were 
only introduced in 1995. In 2011 there were still less than 10 revenue rules in the EU. 
When these rules are implemented, their main goal is to avoid pro-cyclical policies. An 
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example of such rules is one that obliges the allocation of surplus funds towards debt 
reduction (European Commission, 2010).   
2.7.2. The Fiscal Rule Index 
With the purpose of evaluating if the institutional framework in which fiscal 
policy is conducted creates an environment of compliance with fiscal rules, the 
European Commission relies on the Fiscal Rule Index (FRI)
4
. This index shows to what 
extent a certain fiscal rule is binding and considers the influence of several institutional 
characteristics, such as: (i) the statutory base of the rule, (ii) room for setting/revising its 
objectives, (iii) the body in charge of monitoring respect and enforcement of the rule, 
(iv) rule enforcement mechanisms and (v) the media visibility of the rule.  
The first criterion (statutory base of the rule) is rated on a scale of 1 to 4, 1 
indicating that a fiscal rule was adopted by political commitment by a given authority 
and 4 indicating that a fiscal rule was enshrined in a Member State’s national 
constitution. The second criterion (that evaluates if there is room for setting or revising 
objectives) is rated from complete sovereignty in setting objectives (1) to no margin 
whatsoever for revising objectives (3). The third criterion relates to the nature of the 
body that monitors respect and enforces the fiscal rules and is thus assessed by two 
separate ratings. Both are rated from 1 (no regular monitoring of the rule or no specific 
body in charge of enforcement) to 3 (monitoring or enforcement is done by an 
independent institution). The fourth criterion measures the strength of rule enforcement 
mechanisms. This indicator is rated from 1, in the absence of any enforcement 
mechanisms, to 4, in case there are automatic correction and sanction mechanisms in the 
event of non-compliance with the rule. Lastly, the fifth criterion refers to media 
visibility of the rule and reflects if there is scarce interest of the media in rule 
compliance (1) or if the media closely monitors rule compliance (3). 
The Fiscal Rule Strength Index (FRSI) is obtained by combining all the 
aforementioned scores into one composite index. Since, as referred by the European 
                                                 
4
Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/fiscal_rules/index_en.htm. 
Accessed on February, 5
th
 2014. 
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Commission
5
, there is no clear theoretical indication or preference vis-à-vis the weight 
attributed to each criterion, the index is calculated in numerous ways, in order to 
account for several possible weightings.  
Based on the FRSI, the European Commission proceeds to calculate the Fiscal 
Rule Index (FRI), aggregating the scores per country per year. In order to do so, the 
fiscal rule strength indices are weighted according to the fiscal rule’s coverage of 
government finances. The calculation of the FRI takes the presence of several rules 
covering the same government sub-sector into account by applying different weights to 
fiscal rules according to their strength. Even though the construction of this index is 
somewhat complex, its interpretation is more or less straightforward. All 
aforementioned criterions are rated in a similar way (from the least desirable 
classification to the most), which indicates that a smaller value of FRI is indication of 
poor fiscal rule compliance and a loose fiscal framework whereas a higher value 
indicates a high level of compliance and thus a tighter fiscal framework. 
Figure 1, below, shows data on the average FRI in the EMU. The trend is clear; 
increased fiscal efforts over time have led to the continuous increase of fiscal 
compliance in the EMU. This would mean it would have become increasingly difficult 
for fiscal cycles to occur in the Eurozone. However, the next chart (Figure 2) reflects 
the average compliance of each Member State in relation to their existing fiscal rules. 
Overall, results in the broad context of the Economic and Monetary Union are 
somewhat worrisome, seeing as the majority of countries “scores” negatively on the 
FRI. This would be a first indication that this group of countries is more susceptible to 
fiscal manipulation than the other and could therefore experience far more political 
budget cycles than otherwise.  
 
                                                 
5
Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/fiscal_rules/index_en.htm. 
Accessed on February, 5
th
 2014 
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2.8. Empirical evidence in Political Budget Cycles  
Most studies on political budget cycles are empirically based and use 
econometric tools to test their hypothesis. Many methodologies have been applied in the 
extensive literature on political budget cycles. Table 1 condenses relevant information 
concerning the used methodology in empirical analysis regarding political budget cycles 
by the authors referred in this text. 
 
Table 1 – Some empirical studies on political budget cycles 
 
Author 
(Year) 
Sample 
and period 
Method Variables Findings 
Without controlling for fiscal rules 
Schuknecht 
(1996) 
35 
developing 
countries 
 
1972-1992 
Fixed 
Effects 
Dependent: overall fiscal balance before 
grants of central government as share of GDP 
 
Independent: lagged dependent variable, 
trading partners’ output, trade-orientedness, 
wars, catastrophes and political regimes 
(dummies), terms of trade, IMF-supported 
programs.  
Evidence of 
electorally induced 
fiscal cycles. 
Trade-orientedness 
and presence of 
IMF programs are 
relevant. 
Kneebone 
and 
McKenzie 
(2001) 
Canadian 
provinces 
 
1966-1997 
Seemingly 
Unrelated 
Regres-
sions 
Dependent: change in aggregate spending 
and revenue, primary deficit, disaggregated 
spending and revenue as fractions of 
provincial GDP 
 
Independent: control variables (lagged 
change in the dependent variable, changes in 
provincial unemployment rate, Canada-US 
nominal exchange rate, short-term real 
interest rate and in the ratio of provincial debt 
to provincial GDP), election yer and partisan 
dummies 
Evidence of 
government 
opportunistic 
behavior only in 
terms of 
expenditures. 
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Brender and 
Drazen 
(2005) 
68 
democratic 
countries 
 
1960-2001 
GMM 
Dependent: central government surplus, total 
expenditure, total revenue and grants (as 
percentage of GDP) 
 
Independent: control (GDP per capita, trade 
share, share of population aged 15-64 and 
65+, output gap, measured as the log-
difference between real GDP and its HP 
trend), electoral dummy, country fixed effects 
Significant deficit 
and spending cycle 
for new 
democracies. 
Shi and 
Svensson 
(2006) 
85 countries 
 
1975-1995 
GMM 
Dependent: budget balance-to-GDP 
 
Independent: log GDP per capita, log GDP 
growth rates, election dummy, level of 
development dummy 
Evidence of 
political budget 
cycles. 
Chang (2008) 
21 OECD 
countries 
 
1973-2000 
 
 
 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent: “social security and welfare” and 
“economic services” as fractions of total 
expenditure. 
 
Independent: preelection year indicator, 
electoral system dummy, veto player structure 
dummy, control variables (unemployment 
rate, dependency ratio, log of GDP per capita, 
proxy of government ideological position, log 
of number of electoral districts, inflation rate). 
Cycles in targeted 
spending only 
when controlling 
for political 
variables. 
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Drazen and 
Eslava (2010) 
Colombian 
municipali-
ties 
 
1987-2002 
GMM 
Dependent: current spending (general 
payments, personnel and current transfers), 
investment (urban infrastructure, water, 
energy, and communications, education, 
health, housing) and debt service (all 
variables are logs at constant 1998 prices);  
 
Independent: preelection year dummy, 
control variables (log of state population and 
state per capita GDP), lagged deficit, 
Incumbent Advantage (percentage share of 
votes in the last election), log aggregate GDP, 
interest rates, time trend, aggregate level 
Fiscal Dependence indicator. 
Change in 
expenditure 
composition in 
favor of more 
visible categories 
during election 
years. 
Efthyvoulou 
(2011) 
 
Cyprus 
 
1978-2006 
ARCH 
(tests on fiscal policy instruments) 
Dependent: output growth rates, 
unemployment and inflation rates, M2 growth 
rates, yearly change in government public 
debt-to-GDP. 
 
Independent: budget deficits and fiscal 
components, degree of economic 
globalization,  measure for cyclical 
fluctuations, measure for transitory spending 
shocks, political dummies, demographic 
dummy and a variable measuring the 
disagreement among legislators over the 
proposed annual budget. 
Strong electoral 
cycles in social 
transfers and direct 
taxes. 
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Controlling for fiscal rules 
Andrikopoulo
s et al. (2004) 
EMU-15 
(except 
Luxembourg 
 
1970-1998 
ARMA 
Dependent: cyclical component of each fiscal 
variable: (total government expenditure, 
government spending, gross capital formation, 
total current transfers* (to households and 
enterprises*) direct and indirect taxes), and 
target variable (GDP, personal disposable 
income, private consumption, rates of 
unemployment and inflation) per EU country. 
*expressed in percentage terms. All other 
variables are expressed in 1990 prices. 
 
Independent: lagged dependent variable, pre- 
and post-election year political dummy, 
dummies that capture the impact of the 
Maastricht Treaty on the dependent variable, 
interaction dummy between political and 
Maastricht dummies, dummy to capture 
dictatorial governments. 
Evidence 
suggests that 
governments 
have not been 
using fiscal 
policy for 
opportunistic 
reasons but 
rather for 
macroeconomic 
stabilization 
policies. 
Mink and de 
Haan (2006) 
Countries of 
the EMU-12, 
1999-2004 
Multi 
VAR 
Dependent: change in net lending as 
percentage of GDP (with interest) 
 
Independent: difference between actual real 
GDP growth and real growth as forecast at the 
time fiscal policy was determined for each 
year; difference between actual inflation and 
inflation as forecast at the time fiscal policy 
was determined for each year; change in output 
gap in each year (as a percentage of GDP); 
election year and election timing dummies; 
Evidence of 
election year 
expansionary 
policies. 
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Rose (2006) 
43 American 
states 
 
1974-1999 
GMM 
Dependent: fiscal aggregate per capita 
(surplus, tax revenues or spending). 
 
Independent: election dummies, “no-carry” 
rules dummy, control variables (real per capita 
state income, real per capita federal 
government grants, unemployment rate, 
demographic variables, partisan composition of 
government), interaction between electoral 
dummies and no-carry dummy. 
 
Evidence of 
budget 
worsening in 
states without 
fiscal rules. 
Schneider 
(2010) 
West German 
states 
 
1970-2003 
Fixed 
Effects 
Vector 
Decom-
position 
Dependent: log of the annual growth of the 
budget deficit, overall expenditures and social 
security expenditures; 
 
Independent: preelection year indicator, 
Maastricht treaty dummy, control variables 
(inflation rate, absolute employment, real GDP 
growth, first and second oil crises), German 
unification variable, city states dummy, party 
variable and coalition dummy. 
No cycle in 
budget deficits 
but clear cycle 
in social security 
expenditures. 
Efthyvoulou 
(2012) 
EU-27 
 
1997-2008 
Fixed 
Effects 
and 
GMM  
Dependent: fiscal policy instrument (net 
lending, total expenditure and revenue, current 
expenditure and revenue, final consumption 
expenditure, total taxes) as percentage of GDP. 
 
Independent: control variables (log real GDP 
per capita, trade shock, demographic variables, 
partisan variable), GDP growth rate, electoral 
variables and country-specific effects. 
Evidence of 
political budget 
cycles. 
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Ebeke and 
Ölçer (2013) 
68 Low 
Income 
Countries 
 
1990-2010 
GMM 
Dependent: government consumption, public 
investment, tax revenues (direct, indirect and 
trade taxes), budget balance 
 
Independent: control variables (real GDP 
growth rate, inflation rate, trade openness, 
foreign aid, external debt, natural resource 
rents, agriculture value added, fiscal rules, 
election dummy, fiscal rules dummy; 
(all variables expressed in ratio) 
Evidence of 
higher 
government 
consumption 
and fiscal deficit 
during election 
years. 
Tsai (2014) 
46 American 
states 
 
1977-2008 
GMM 
Dependent: state public expenditures 
(education, health, transportation, welfare, 
security and corrections) 
 
Independent: ACIR (fiscal rule stringency 
index), total population, percentage of 
population under the age of seventeen and over 
sixy-five, personal income, unemployment rate, 
lagged interest expenditure on general debt, 
intergovernmental transfer revenue, electoral 
year, divided government, democratic governor 
and term limits. 
Public spending 
cycles are 
dampened as 
more stringent 
fiscal 
restrictions are 
imposed. 
 
From Table 1, above, it is clear that the literature covers different country 
samples and time frames and that the results are, on some level, unanimous. The most 
commonly used estimation method is the GMM, nevertheless the literature disperses 
and other methods are also commonly used. 
The next chapter covers the empirical study that is the object of this study. The 
expected results are that the overall net lending shows no significant cycles due to fiscal 
rules. It is however expected that categories which are most visible to the voters, such as 
current social transfers will be more prone to fiscal cycles.   
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3. Rules and political budget-composition cycles: an 
empirical application to the EMU 
As stated before, the main goal of this chapter is trying to determine whether 
EMU Member States feel tempted to manipulate specific budget categories as opposed 
to incur in deficits in order to meet electoral objectives. Section 3.1 introduces the 
empirical work core to this study and provides a simplistic approach to the data used in 
the subsequent analysis. The used empirical model is described and explained in section 
3.2 and the choice of methodology is clarified in 3.3. Furthermore, this study aims at 
understanding which fiscal rules are most (and least) effective in deterring opportunistic 
behavior by extending the existing empirical model through the inclusion of granular 
information on fiscal rules. The empirical process of this analysis is described and 
analyzed in sub-section 3.4.5. 
The empirical analysis focuses on a panel of 14 members of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU)
7
 with annual data over the period of 1991-2007. We 
deliberately excluded the more recent members of the Eurozone (namely Estonia, 
Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia) since they represent economic outliers and would 
otherwise skew the results of the estimation. As is well-known the latest global financial 
crisis heavily impacted on European economies at various levels and, in particular, 
imposed several constrains on fiscal policy. This impact is thus visible in the previously 
discussed charts. It is fairly reasonable to assume that this structural break in the data 
might skew the empirical results and might be the reason why significant effects would 
be absent from the estimations. The choice was hence made as to exclude data from 
2008 onwards. 
The regressions include economic, demographic, political and electoral 
variables. All data on fiscal, economic, and demographic variables were obtained from 
the AMECO database
8
 from the European Commission. Data on political as well as on 
electoral variables were retrieved from the Database of Political Institutions from the 
                                                 
7
 The Member States considered are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 
8
Available at:  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm. Accessed March 
13
th
, 2014. 
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World Bank
9
 (Beck et al., 2001). Data on fiscal rules, such as the Fiscal Rule Index and 
the different types of fiscal rules, were obtained from the European Commission
10
 and 
from Nerlich and Reuter (2013). Annexes I and II provide a detailed description and 
statistics of all data used. 
3.1. A first approach 
Before the econometric analysis it is important to have a general idea of EMU 
Member States’ public finances, particularly regarding the evolution of fiscal deficits 
over time, as well as the composition of the fiscal budgets.  
3.1.1. Fiscal deficits 
An initial look at Figure 3, below, shows some similarities between the Member 
States’ fiscal primary deficits. The current financial crisis presents as a structural break 
common to every Member State; there is a steep drop in fiscal balance around 2008 
(exceptions are Luxembourg and Malta). From this point onwards the data show a clear 
improvement in the fiscal balance in virtually every country (except in Finland and 
Luxembourg), which is either an indication of the formal austerity measures taken (e.g., 
in countries subject to IMF programs) or of a renewed sense of fiscal responsibility in 
the other Member States. 
However, Figure 3 also illustrates significant differences regarding fiscal deficit 
evolution across EMU countries. For instance, there are clearly countries which have 
predominantly experienced deficits (France, Greece, Malta, and Portugal) as opposed to 
countries that have largely experienced budget surplus (Belgium, Finland, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). Others, such as Austria, Cyprus, and 
Spain have no predominant fiscal balance situation. 
  
                                                 
9
 Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-
1107449512766/DPI2012_Codebook2.pdf. Accessed March 13
th
, 2014. 
10
 Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/fiscal_rules/index_en.htm. 
Accessed March 20
th
, 2014. 
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Figure 3 – Fiscal deficit-to-GDP (excluding debt service) 
 
This analysis can be extended by comparing each Member State’s predominant 
fiscal balance with the corresponding average FRI (Figure 4 shows the evolution of FRI 
among the EMU countries). Table 3 condenses this information. The countries were 
organized by the predominant stance of fiscal balance, which is either positive (+), 
negative (-), or none (/) (there is no predominant fiscal situation). First, it is clear to 
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conclude that the majority of countries that largely experiences budget surpluses 
exhibit, on average, positive FRI whereas states that commonly exhibit deficits have, on 
average, negative FRI. However rather rude, this might be an indication of the influence 
of fiscal rule compliance on Member States’ fiscal stance.  
 
 
Figure 4 – Fiscal Rule Index  
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Table 3 – Comparison between average fiscal balance and average FRI 
 
Predominant fiscal balance Country Mean FRI 
+ 
Belgium + 
Finland + 
+ Germany 
Ireland - 
Italy - 
Luxembourg + 
Netherlands + 
- 
France + 
Greece - 
Malta - 
Portugal - 
/ 
Austria - 
Cyprus - 
Spain + 
 
3.1.2. Evolution of budget composition 
Expenditure 
It is interesting to analyze the countries’ budget composition over time since it 
provides an idea of its trends and fiscal preferences. 
Figure 5, below, shows the Member States’ expenditure composition over time. 
CF/G_TOT_I represents the weight of Gross Fixed Capital Formation on Total Primary 
Expenditure, TR/G_TOT_I refers to Social Transfers-to-Total Primary Expenditure, 
INTC/G_TOT_I is the Intermediate Consumption-to-Total Primary Expenditure, and W 
represents the weight of Employee Compensation on Total Primary Expenditure. 
On a first look, there are some countries that stand out for maintaining that 
composition relatively constant over time. That is the case for Austria, Belgium, France, 
and Italy. In these countries, on average, Social Transfers account for 30% to 40% of 
total expenditures, Employee Compensation for 20% to 30%. Intermediate 
Consumption and Gross Fixed Capital Formation only account for around 5% to 15% of 
total Expenditures. Even though Italy displays little fluctuation in each category, the 
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weight of Social Transfers has been increasing over the last decade, presumably at the 
cost of Employee Compensation. This is also noticeable in both Austria and France but 
at a slower rate. Finland and Spain are also relatively constant, apart from the fact that 
in the first case Social Transfers surpassed Employee Compensation in weight and in 
the latter case Social Transfers have been increasing at the expenses of Capital 
Formation. 
Other charts show countries in which there is some fluctuation but always 
around a trend. This is the case for countries such as Cyprus, Germany, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Malta, and the Netherlands (which only experience higher fluctuation in 
Social Transfers). The weight of each fiscal category remains fairly constant and is 
similar to the aforementioned.  
Portugal and Ireland exhibit strong fluctuation. On one hand, Ireland does not 
display a discernible pattern in the fiscal category weight distribution and has very high 
fluctuation in almost every fiscal category. On the other, Portugal has less fluctuation 
but still no apparent weighting pattern. 
The economic crisis is quite discernible in these charts. The post-2008 period is 
dominated by a generalized rise in Social Transfers (exceptions are Belgium, Germany 
and Luxemburg) which was compensated by a decrease in other expenditure categories. 
Countries such as Cyprus, Finland, France, Italy, Malta and the Netherlands opted to 
balance this rise with a decrease in Employee Compensation. Greece, Ireland and Spain 
reduced their expenditure with Gross Fixed Capital Formation, whereas Austria and 
Portugal opted for a decrease in both categories. 
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Figure 5 – Expenditure categories-to-primary expenditure 
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Revenue 
Figure 6, below, shows the evolution of revenue composition in each Member 
State. This category is far more heterogeneous than the expenditure. 
TI/TOT represents the weight of Indirect Tax on Total Revenue, whereas 
TD/TOT refers to Direct Tax-to-Total Revenue. SOC/T_TOT is referent to the weight 
of Social Contributions Received in terms of Total Revenue. 
For starters, there are countries with different preferences regarding their main 
source of revenue. For instance, Cyprus, Malta, and Portugal rely more on Indirect 
Taxes as their main source of fiscal revenue. Finland and Luxembourg, instead, prefer 
Direct Taxes. Lastly, Social Contributions are the most important source of revenue in 
the majority of countries, namely in Austria, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, 
and Spain. One of the exceptions is Belgium, in which Direct Taxes and Social 
Contributions have more or less the same weight in total revenue. In Greece, on the 
other hand, Indirect Taxes and Social Contributions have more or less the same weight. 
In Ireland this situation occurs with Direct and Indirect Taxes. Finally, in Italy there is 
no preference regarding one particular source of revenue. 
Moreover, there are some differences regarding volatility as well. In most cases, 
there are some fluctuations around a discernible trend but these are generally not 
significant. In other cases there is a clear shift in revenue composition. For example, in 
Italy there has been a clear effort to evenly distribute sources of income. In France this 
evolution is present as well, but to a lesser extent.  
Overall, Direct Taxes appear to be the category with most fluctuation, which 
makes sense given their predominant role as automatic stabilizers. Moreover, this 
category is easy to manipulate and produces almost immediate and fairly expected 
results. 
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Figure 6 – Revenue categories-to-revenue 
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3.2. Econometric model 
The empirical strategy draws on the standard political budget cycle literature and 
thus relies on several fiscal indicators as dependent variables. The baseline regression is 
as follows: 
 
                                                         
                                                         
                     (3.1) 
  
where       is a fiscal indicator in country i in year t, ELE1 is an electoral 
dummy, GPD to GDP is the Gross Public Debt-to-GDP, FRI is the Fiscal Rule Index, 
        is the lagged fiscal indicator, RGDPg is the Real GDP Growth-to-GDP, and 
ΔDepRatio is the variation of the Dependency Ratio. 
The empirical approach is based on Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) and will be 
organized by different levels of disaggregation of the fiscal indicator. A first regression 
(I) considers the most aggregate fiscal indicator, i.e., the dependent variable is the 
primary surplus (net lending, nlend). In the second (II) and third (III) regressions the 
dependent variables are total primary expenditure (g_tot_i_gdp) and total revenue 
(t_tot_gdp), respectively. The remaining regressions are included to account for the the 
disaggregation of total expenditures and revenues as dependent variables, i.e., the fiscal 
indicators considered are Gross Fixed Capital Formation (cf_gdp), Intermediate 
Consumption (intc_gdp), Compensation of Employees (w_gdp), Social Benefits 
(tr_gdp), Direct Taxes (td_gdp), Indirect Taxes (ti_gdp), and Social Contributions 
Received (soc_gdp). All fiscal indicators are scaled to GDP. 
As for the explanatory regressors, the lagged fiscal indicator is included to 
capture variable persistence (as was done by, for instance, Ebeke and Ölçer, 2013), 
seeing as fiscal policy is highly determined by the level of indexation of current fiscal 
values to past ones. The convention in literature regarding electoral variables is the 
consideration of only the highest level of elections (Brender and Drazen, 2005; Shi and 
Svensson, 2006; Efthyoulou, 2012; Ebeke and Ölçer, 2013). Therefore, this study only 
focuses on legislative elections in countries with a parliamentary system and on 
executive elections in presidential countries. ELE1 is a dummy variable which indicates 
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if elections took place in a certain year (1) or not (0). Naturally, this variable is core to 
our work and needed to be included in order to evaluate the effect of elections on fiscal 
policy. Gross Public Debt as percentage of GDP is included as regressor as it represents 
additional restrictions on public spending, as suggested by, e.g., Pinho (2008), and plays 
therefore a crucial part in defining fiscal policy. It is expected that this regressor will 
mainly impact expenditure categories more than revenue categories and will thus 
largely influence fiscal policy on this level. The variation of the dependency ratio is 
taken into account since countries with higher share of older population typically 
experience higher public spending (due to particular needs such as social security and 
health expenditure) which affects their fiscal stance. This fiscal variable mainly affects 
fiscal policy on the expenditure side since it has an immediate impact on categories 
such as Social Transfers and Employee Compensation. The choice was made to include 
this variable as its variation instead of its (lagged) value since the use of the latter 
produced economically incorrect results. Similarly to Klomp and the Haan (2013), this 
equation includes the real GDP growth rate (RGDPg) in order to account for the 
influence of the business cycle. Economic growth heavily impacts fiscal policy on all 
levels: both expenditure and revenue wise. Finally, the Fiscal Rule Index is used as to 
ascertain the level of enforcement and compliance of fiscal rules within Member States. 
Further, the regression contains terms of interaction between the Fiscal Rules Index 
with the election dummy in order to measure if fiscal rules reduce the incentives to 
produce political budget cycles. The regression also includes interaction terms of the 
FRI with the GPD-to-GDP, the lagged fiscal variable under consideration and the real 
GDP growth. These terms also capture the influence of fiscal rules in the feedback of 
fiscal indicators to, respectively, debt stock, the fiscal indicator in the previous period 
and the cycle phase. 
3.3. Methodology 
The use of panel data offers interesting investigating possibilities but it is not 
without problems. As is shown in Tables 1 and 2, above, the political cycle literature is 
somewhat disperse regarding empirical methodology. Analyzing the empirical literature 
review in this document, it becomes clear that the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) has been preferred and it has been so for a number of reasons. It is advised for 
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estimations with dynamic panels in order to control for country-specific effects which 
are biased caused by lagged dependent variables (Shi and Svensson, 2006). 
Yet, according to Cameron and Trivedi (2005) the use of GMM requires a high 
number of cross-sections for a short period of time in order to obtain more efficient 
estimators. However, this requirement is not met by the data panel used in this 
document since it is comprised of only 14 members of the Economic and Monetary 
Union and covers a 17-year time period. Furthermore, since GMM employs several 
variable lags, the reduced time period would reduce the number of observations even 
further. Therefore, there was the need to pursue a different estimation strategy. As the 
Fixed Effects Method is also a recurrent one among this strand of literature, it might 
thus be a good alternative. 
Given the challenges that arise when using panel data, we first need to choose 
between either a fixed- or a random-effects model (Gujarati, 2004). As suggested by 
Woolridge (2006) and Gujarati (2004), the choice between a Random and a Fixed 
Effects Model is contingent on a number of factors. For instance, on a “logical” level, 
the authors indicate that if the sample is not composed of completely random 
observations the best estimation method is the Fixed Effects Model (FEM). On a more 
analytical level, Gujarati (2004) suggests that if T (number of years) is large and N 
(number of cross-sections) is small, FEM is preferable due to computational 
convenience, even though FEM and Random Effects Model produce similar estimators. 
Empirically, Hausman (1978) developed tests which generically are based on the 
comparison of two different estimators and that are helpful in making the decision 
between two estimation methods. In this case, the Hausman test compares the within 
estimator with the random effects estimator and produces a test statistic. The rejection 
of the null hypothesis indicates that the use of the FEM is the better option (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2005). 
Since the current data panel consists of 14 Economic and Monetary Union 
Member States (and thus cross-sections were not randomly assembled) over a 17-year 
period, the chosen estimation method was the FEM. Further, according to Schneider 
(2010), since the main goal of this study is to analyze changes over time within 
countries, this model is “warranted theoretically” (Schneider, 2010, p. 133). The choice 
of this method is justified, as proven by the results of the Hausman tests in Annex III. 
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The methodology is pursued using EViews software, which is also equipped to run 
redundant fixed effects by using sums-of-squares (F-test) and the likelihood function 
(Chi-squared test) in order to account for the significance of cross-section effects, 
period effects and their joined significance (see Annex IV). The tests indicate that when 
the estimations include as dependent variables the Net Lending, Total Expenditure, and 
Intermediate Consumption, both cross-section and period fixed effects are identified. 
When Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Social Transfers, Employee Compensation, 
Indirect Taxes, and Social Contributions Received are used, only cross-section fixed 
effects are identified. Finally when Total Revenue and Direct Taxes are set as fiscal 
indicators we only find significant period fixed effects. 
Even though panel data renders the Ordinary Least Squares estimator consistent 
but not optimal, this is resolved by using White standard errors which correct for 
heteroscedasticity. 
3.4. Analysis of results 
As previously mentioned, the empirical analysis is conducted at three levels: (1) 
Total Primary Surplus (Net Lending), (2) Total Expenditure and Total Revenue, and (3) 
Disaggregated Expenditure and Disaggregated Revenue. All estimation results can be 
consulted in Table 4, below. 
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Table 4a – Estimation results 
 
 I II III IV V 
ELE1 
0.1297 
(0.401141) 
0.005** 
(2.444789) 
-0.0007 
(-0.339797) 
0.0001 
(0.312212) 
0.0006 
(1.592259) 
GPD to GDP-1 
-1.9683 
(-1.184861) 
-0.012 
(-0.741186) 
0.0122** 
(2.378001) 
-0.0046* 
(-1.882338) 
-0.0032 
(-1.155579) 
FRI-1 
0.4155 
(0.837030) 
0.0335*** 
(2.748049) 
0.0108 
(1.205654) 
0.0017 
(1.149966) 
0.0002 
(0.116182) 
ELE1*FRI-1 
-0.4036 
(-1.184657) 
-0.0059** 
(-2.249601) 
-0.0050** 
(-1.923902) 
-0.0007 
(-1.489256) 
-0.0010* 
(-1.846255) 
GPD to GDP-1*FRI-1 
-1.6411 
(-0.989689) 
-0.007 
(-0.437081) 
0.0121** 
(2.345927) 
-0.0039* 
(-1.719551) 
-0.0035 
(-1.318827) 
FV-1 
0.5893*** 
(7.919574) 
0.7956*** 
(13.40611) 
0.9080*** 
(39.45504) 
0.8140*** 
(16.75598) 
0.815*** 
(15.66768) 
FV-1*FRI-1 
-0.0093 
(-0.124816) 
-0.0705** 
(-2.306315) 
-0.01399 
(-0.612030) 
0.0057 
(0.114936) 
0.0204 
(0.694892) 
RGDPG 
4.0394 
(0.599183) 
-0.3042*** 
(-5.510435) 
-0.2095*** 
(-4.997240) 
-0.0285** 
(-2.363599) 
-0.0283*** 
(-2.723049) 
RGDPG*FRI-1 
4.32988 
(0.849347) 
-0.0933** 
(-1.993136) 
-0.1529*** 
(-3.566952) 
-0.0058 
(-0.564017) 
-0.003 
(-0.395750) 
ΔDEPRATIO 
16.7556 
(0.349430) 
0.0402 
(0.104767) 
-0.1931 
(-0.780363) 
0.1231 
(1.652289) 
0.0401 
(0.482268) 
      
No. Observations 210 222 222 222 222 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6558 0.953340 0.962831 0.871535 0.957795 
F-statistic 11.21 116.7793 221.1850 66.18758 129.5988 
* - significant at 10%, ** - significant at 5%, *** - significant at 1%. 
Note 1: Specifications for alternative fiscal indicators: I – Net Lending, II – Total Primary Expenditure, 
III – Total Revenue, IV – Capital Formation, V – Intermediate Consumption. 
Note 2: GPD – Gross Public Debt, FV – Fiscal variable under consideration, RGDPG – Real GDP 
Growth, DEPRATIO – Dependency Ratio. 
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Table 4b – Estimation results (Continuation) 
 
 VI VII VIII IX X 
ELE1 
0.0015** 
(2.282422) 
0.0016*** 
(2.747715) 
-0.0026** 
(-2.307204) 
0.0005 
(0.690202) 
0.001 
(1.608785) 
GPD to GDP-1 
-0.0098** 
(-2.411594) 
-0.0092** 
(-2.462627) 
0.0082** 
(2.376012) 
0.0053 
(1.188678) 
-0.0096*** 
(-2.603696) 
FRI-1 
0.0080** 
(2.532904) 
0.0027 
(0.592061) 
0.0037 
(1.470858) 
0.0051* 
(1.755703) 
0.0146*** 
(3.925785) 
ELE1*FRI-1 
-0.0022** 
(-2.489809) 
-0.0020** 
(-2.365305) 
-0.0017 
(-1.244031) 
-0.0002 
(0.171996) 
-0.0013 
(-1.526970) 
GPD to GDP-1*FRI-1 
-0.009** 
(-2.242062) 
-0.0085** 
(-2.336981) 
0.0079** 
(2.293766) 
0.0043* 
(0.970186) 
-0.0094** 
(-2.514429) 
FV-1 
0.9222*** 
(36.49411) 
0.8974*** 
(29.56396) 
0.9347*** 
(36.11613) 
0.9704*** 
(34.97732) 
0.8433*** 
(27.04043) 
FV-1*FRI-1 
-0.0345 
(-1.549397) 
0.0064 
(0.136226) 
-0.0095 
(-0.395492) 
-0.0297 
(-1.214009) 
-0.0834*** 
(-3.093429) 
RGDPG 
-0.1452*** 
(-8.810704) 
-0.072*** 
(-4.557274) 
-0.0638*** 
(-2.801045) 
-0.0422** 
(-2.427465) 
-0.062*** 
(-4.715767) 
RGDPG*FRI-1 
-0.0316** 
(-1.904750) 
-0.0102 
(-0.690407) 
-0.0842*** 
(-4.224409) 
-0.0452* 
(-2.755440) 
-0.0237 
(-1.521042) 
ΔDEPRATIO 
0.0948 
(0.780195) 
0.1631 
(1.639998) 
-0.1484 
(-1.159371) 
-0.0505 
(0.362375) 
-0.0022 
(0.020258) 
      
      
No. Observations 222 222 222 222 222 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9775 0.9592 0.9479 0.9466 0.984849 
F-statistic 417.9086 226.6249 155.4916 171.4174 625.5889 
* - significant at 10%, ** - significant at 5%, *** - significant at 1%. 
Note 1: Specifications for alternative fiscal indicators: VI – Social Transfers, VII – Employee 
Compensation, VIII – Direct Taxes, IX – Indirect Taxes, X – Social Contributions Received. 
Note 2: GPD – Gross Public Debt, FV – Fiscal variable under consideration, RGDPG – Real GDP 
Growth, DEPRATIO – Dependency Ratio. 
3.4.1. Net Lending 
This variable excludes debt interests and is defined in percentage of GDP at 
market prices. According to more recent literature discussed above, the presence of 
fiscal rules in this sample of countries inhibits fiscal cycles from occurring at the 
aggregate deficit level. The empirical results support this hypothesis. Results from 
Regression I show that there is no significant electoral effect nor do fiscal rules seem to 
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affect net lending for this sample of countries. This might lend to support to the 
hypothesis that this sample of countries, being subject to debt and deficit limits, do not 
experience the “traditional” political cycles but might rather experience cycles on 
disaggregated budget components while still verifying the overall budget balance. Thus, 
we should test for the existence of political cycles as we proceed to more disaggregated 
categories. 
3.4.2. Aggregate Expenditure and Revenue 
The variable Aggregate Expenditure refers to total primary expenditure and is 
defined in percentage of GDP at market prices. 
At a first glance, these equations (Regressions II and III in Table 4) notably 
conform better to the data than the previous one (adjusted R-Squared for Regression II 
and III, respectively, of 95% and 96%) and the overall significance of the variables is 
equally satisfactory. 
In terms of Aggregate Expenditure (estimation II), almost all of the coefficients 
display the expected sign. We find political cycle in aggregate expenditure: the election 
variable has a positive sign and is very significant, which means that total expenditure 
increases during election years. Moreover, the total electoral effect depends on the FRI: 
the higher the tightness and coverage of fiscal rules, the lower the incentive to increase 
expenditure in election years. For example, if the FRI is negative, say -1, there is an 
increase of 1.09 percentage points on total primary expenditure in election years.
11
 
Conversely, in order for the variation in total primary expenditure to be at least 0 in 
election years, the FRI has to be at least of 0.85.
12 
 
Gross Public Debt-to-GDP has a negative sign, which is consistent with the 
notion of high public debt constricting expenditure growth. However, the coefficient 
does not display statistical significance. The interaction term between Gross Public 
Debt and the FRI does not display any significance either.  
The lagged variable has the expected sign and is highly significant. The 
coefficient of the interaction term between the lagged variable and the FRI is also 
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significant and tells us that the higher the FRI the lower the indexation of primary 
expenditure to past expenditure. 
It would be expected that Real GDP Growth had a positive sign since economic 
growth is usually associated with an increase in government expenditure. This might be 
explained by the effect of automatic stabilizers in periods of increased economic growth 
which lead to a decrease in total expenditures. Furthermore, if the effect of automatic 
stabilizers proved insufficient, the high rates in economic growth would lead 
governments to act countercyclically and total expenditure would contract. This effect is 
showed in the empirical results, which further show that the presence of fiscal rules 
enhances this countercyclical effect. 
The coefficient of the Dependency Ratio variation, despite having the correct 
sign, it is not significant. The higher the growth of dependent population appears to be 
rather neutral in affecting overall government expenditure. 
Regarding Aggregate Revenue (estimation III), this variable is also defined in 
percentage of GDP at market prices. The estimation is overall satisfactory. The electoral 
variable’s coefficient displays the expected sign in the presence of political cycles: one 
of the methods to conduct fiscal cycles is by cutting taxes, as discussed before. The 
electoral variable alone is not significant, though; however the interaction between this 
variable and the FRI indicates that during election years revenue falls by about 0.5 
percentage points (if FRI equals 1), as foreseen by the literature. In conjunction with the 
previous result on expenditure, we find that tight fiscal rules incentive tax reduction 
together with expenditure contention in election years. 
The feedback coefficients on Gross Public Debt are highly significant and in line 
with economic theory; the higher the amount of GPD, the higher government revenue 
has to be to fulfill the intertemporal budget constraint. A higher FRI reinforces this 
feedback. 
The lagged variable also has the expected sign. In this case, FRI does not affect 
indexation of total revenues to past values (the interaction term between the lagged 
variable and the FRI is not significant). 
According to estimation III, Total Revenue varies negatively with Real GDP 
Growth (about 21 percentage points) and this effect is accentuated by the FRI. 
However, these results are counter-intuitive since from an economic point of view, 
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revenues should be pro-cyclical. These results might be capturing an effect of reverse 
causality between taxes which was not corrected in this empirical analysis. The 
causality effect between tax structure and economic growth is one that has been 
extensively discussed in the literature. Thus, this effect can be explained by findings 
such as those of Lee and Gordon (2005), which found that some taxes (particularly 
corporate taxes) greatly affect a country’s growth perspective. These authors found that 
particularly high corporate taxes can lead to low growth rates. 
As expected, this first level of budget disaggregation displays more evidence of 
budget cycles than the first (net lending), namely on the expenditure side. The next step 
is to analyze political budget cycles at the subsequent level of disaggregation. 
3.4.3. Disaggregated Expenditure 
As mentioned before, this category will be subdivided into four fiscal categories: 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Intermediate Consumption, Social Transfers, and 
Employee Compensation. All categories of primary expenditure are defined in 
percentage of GDP at market prices and are used as dependent variables in estimations 
IV to VII (Table 4a and 4b). The literature on the subject (such as Drazen and Eslava, 
2010; Schneider, 2010; Efthyvoulou, 2011) suggests that fiscal cycles occur in more 
visible budget categories, such as public investment, mainly in developing countries, 
and social security expenditure in order to signal competence.  
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
Regression IV (Table 4a) does not display any significant electoral effect nor do 
fiscal rules seem to be significant. The only significant coefficient regarding the FRI is 
in its interaction term with Gross Public Debt. The effect of this variable is as expected. 
The higher Gross Public Debt-to-GDP, the more constricted public investment 
becomes. Alone, GPD would have an effect of -0.458 percentage points on Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation. However, when a positive (equal to 1) FRI is considered this effect 
is almost doubled and equals -0.8486 percentage points.  
Regarding Real GDP Growth, the sign is also as expected and its coefficient is 
significant at 5%. The more a country grows, the less the need for new investment in 
public infrastructure. The interaction term between this variable and the FRI is not 
significant.  
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The change in Dependency Ratio is almost significant at 10% and has the 
expected sign. As the percentage of dependent population increases there is more need 
for specific facilities to support this population and public investment is expected to 
increase. 
The regression also shows high persistence, with a highly significant coefficient, 
on lagged investment expenditure. Current Capital Formation on GDP is indexed at 
81.4% to the value in the former year. 
The lack of an electoral effect on public investment is somewhat expected since 
this sample consists of only highly developed countries. The political effect on this type 
of expenditure, as described by Drazen and Eslava (2010), was found in Colombian 
municipalities, as in developing countries voters are more prone to value investment in 
certain infrastructures that are already in place in most of the developed countries. 
An absence of fiscal rules’ effect is also expected. As is clear by the charts in 
Figure 4 (section 3.1.1), this category has very low weight on total primary expenditure 
and might therefore be little targeted by fiscal rules. 
Intermediate Consumption 
Results from regression V show some evidence of an electoral effect on 
intermediate consumption. Independently considered, the election year coefficient is not 
significant. However, the analysis of the electoral effect in combination with the FRI 
demonstrates that the higher the FRI, the lower the incentives to engage in higher 
expenditure in election years. Our results show that a FRI equal to 0.6 is sufficient to 
deter an increase in this category during election years. In other words, a positive FRI 
(higher than 0.6) can even reduce Intermediate Consumption spending during election 
years. 
The effect of GPD is not statistically significant; apparently, debt corrections 
hardly rely on reduction of intermediate consumption. 
This variable, as all the aforementioned is persistent and highly determined by 
the expenditure in the previous year, with a statistically significant coefficient. 
However, the interaction term between the lagged variable with the FRI is not 
significant, meaning that fiscal rules tightness are unable to affect indexation. 
Real GDP Growth has a marginal negative effect of 2.83 percentage points on 
Intermediate Consumption and FRI is not significant to this outcome. 
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Once again, the variation in Dependency Ratio does not exhibit a statistically 
significant coefficient. 
Social Transfers 
Regression VI (Table 4b) displays many statistically significant coefficients and 
shows particular significant electoral and fiscal rules effects on social transfers. 
First, the regression indicates that, in electoral years social, expenditure is 15% 
of GDP higher when compared to non-election years. This political effect, however, is 
mitigated by larger values of FRI. Namely, the interaction term ELE1*FRI 
demonstrates that the electoral effect is eliminated when FRI is at least equal to 0.67, 
which is a largely acceptable value. This clearly indicates that the shear presence of 
fiscal rules (and their compliance) alleviates the electoral effect. 
Similarly to previous categories, GPD has a marginal negative effect of 0.97 
percentage points on Social Transfers/GDP. This effect is strengthened as fiscal rules 
become more stringent.  
As was the case for Intermediate Consumption, this variable is persistent in time 
and  has an indexation estimated coefficient of 0.92 to the value in the previous year. 
However, the interaction term between the lagged variable with the FRI does not appear 
significant; FRI is also unable to affect indexation in this case. 
Social Transfers display a highly negative relation with economic growth which 
is also greatly affected by the FRI – this is as expected because transfers work mostly as 
an automatic stabilizer, moving largely countercyclically. Unexpectedly, the 
Dependency Ratio variation does not appear as statistically significant. 
Employee Compensation 
According to the outcomes in regression VII, this category also displays a 
significant electoral effect: Employee Compensation is estimated as being 16% of GDP 
higher in election years. This result evidences that this type of government spending is 
rather “visible” and therefore good for competence signaling as in Rogoff’s (1990) 
model. Moreover, and similar to that observed for other spending components, the 
higher the FRI the lower the incentives for increasing this expenditure during election 
years. 
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The feedback coefficient on debt is also negative, as expected, and a positive 
FRI enhances this effect greatly (when the FRI equals 1, Employee Compensation is 
reduced in about 1.7675 percentage points when debt increases by 1% of GDP). 
Employee Compensation in GDP exhibits persistency and is indexed to the 
value in the previous year by 89%. However, once again the interaction term between 
the lagged variable with the FRI does not seem to be significant. 
Real GDP Growth seems to produce a negative marginal effect of roughly 7.2 
percentage points on the ratio of Employee Compensation over GDP.  
The Dependency Ratio variation is almost significant at 10% and is positively 
correlated with Employee Compensation. The fact that a higher percentage of 
dependent population requires specific government spending (such as the creation of 
care facilities and other activities specifically designed to cater to certain population 
groups) might lead to an increase in public job offer and consequently of paid wages.  
3.4.4. Disaggregated Revenue 
Total government revenue will be subdivided into three categories: Direct 
Taxes, Indirect Taxes, and Social Contributions Received. The corresponding 
regressions are, respectively, VIII to X in Table 4b, above. All categories of total 
revenue are defined in percentage of GDP at market prices. 
Direct Taxes 
As was also concluded by Efthyvoulou (2011), regression VIII (Table 4b) on 
Direct Taxes shows a significant electoral effect; during election years, Direct Taxes are 
26% of GDP lower than in non-election years. The FRI does not seem to impact on the 
electoral effect neither it does have an impact on this category alone. This might be a 
reflection of the fact that there are few countries following revenue rules.  
Individually, Gross Public Debt has a positive effect on Direct Taxes of 0.81 
percentage points. Instinctively, higher Public Debt requires higher effort on 
government revenue in order for governments to be able to honor its debt service (and 
the debt itself). As expected, fiscal rules significantly reinforce this effect. 
As most of the budget components, Direct Taxes also exhibit high persistency, 
but the coefficient of the cross term between the lagged value and the FRI is not 
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significant. This also may be due to the fact that there are very few countries with 
revenue rules or that these are not as binding. 
Results show that real GDP Growth is negatively correlated with Direct Taxes 
and is highly significant. This outcome might be a result of reverse causality. The total 
impact of this variable is reinforced by the presence of fiscal rules. The variation in 
percentage of dependent population is not statistically significant. 
Indirect Taxes 
This fiscal category does not display an electoral effect but it does seem to 
respond to the FRI at some levels (see regression IX in Table 4b, above). The FRI has a 
direct marginal effect of 0.5 percentage points on the ratio Indirect Taxes/GDP and has 
also some significant interaction with other relevant variables such as GPD, and Real 
GDP Growth. According to outcomes from regression IX, a higher FRI reinforces the 
feedback coefficient on debt and reduces persistency of indirect taxation while it makes 
taxes even more countercyclical. 
Indirect taxation is also unresponsive to changes in the dependency ratio. 
Social Contributions Received 
Apparently, regression X does not confirm an electoral effect in this fiscal 
category since electoral coefficient, independently, is only significant at 10.93%. This 
does not change when ELE1 is considered simultaneously with the FRI. However, there 
does seem to be a statistically significant marginal impact of fiscal rules in increasing 
Social Contribution in GDP by 1.46 percentage points. 
As was the case for previous categories, Social Contributions responds 
significantly to Gross Public Debt. This effect is exacerbated in interaction with the 
FRI. 
As before, FRI contributes to reduce past indexation but it has no effect on the 
countercyclicality of this indicator. Social Contributions are also unresponsive to 
changes in the demographic structure. 
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3.4.5. The effect of fiscal rules on the political cycle in EMU – a 
closer look 
In this section we expand the previous work by analyzing more detailed aspects 
regarding alternative fiscal rules and their impact on the matter at hand – political 
cycles. In order to do so, four new dummy explanatory variables were introduced: BBR 
(Budget Balance Rule), DR (Debt Rule), ER (Expenditure Rule), and RR (Revenue 
Rule). These indicate the presence (dummy = 1) or the lack (dummy = 0) of the 
alternative types of rules. 
The construction of these variables was based on the work of Nerlich and Reuter 
(2013). A summary of this data is presented in Annex IId. 
3.4.5.1. The role of alternative fiscal rules – a sample-split 
approach 
In a first analysis we propose to compare regression results considering two 
samples: i) a sample of panel observations with where and when a certain type of fiscal 
rule is present; ii) a sample of panel observations with where and when a certain type of 
fiscal rule was not adopted. We used the same baseline regressions of the previous 
subsection, but exclude the FRI-related terms from the set of explanatory variables. 
Since FRI is a composite index of several types of rules in conjunction with their 
strength and coverage, the consideration of both regressors would result in overlapping 
effects. The regression is thus resumed as: 
 
                                                       (3.2) 
 
The strategy used is highly intuitive as it is based on a simple coefficient 
comparison between regressions for each fiscal variable with and without the 
consideration of each type of fiscal rule. For the analysis of the impact of Balanced 
Budget Rules and Debt Rules (Tables 5a and 5b, below), we took as relevant the 
following fiscal indicators: Net Lending (regression I), Total Expenditure (regression 
II), and Total Revenue (regression III). In a similar way, the analysis for Expenditure 
Rules (Table 5c) considered as dependent variables not only Total Expenditure (II) but 
also Gross Fixed Capital Formation (IV), Intermediate Consumption (V), Social 
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Transfers (VI), and Employee Compensation (VII). The effect of Revenue Rules was 
analyzed for all revenue categories: Total Revenue (III), Indirect Taxes (IX), Direct 
Taxes (VIII), and Social Contributions Received (X). As before, the methodology used 
was the Fixed Effects Model (FEM). The type of fixed effects present in each of the 
regressions is discriminated in Annex IV. All remaining relevant information regarding 
these estimations can also be found in Annex IV. 
Balanced Budget Rules 
According to the outcomes in Table 5a, below, in regression I there seems to be 
no discernible electoral effect in Net Lending. These results confirm the robustness of 
the finding that, for this sample, political cycles do not occur at a deficit level. However, 
it is noteworthy that the variation in the Dependency Ratio becomes relevant when 
Budget Balance Rules are present and with the expected sign. Furthermore, results 
indicate that the lack of Budget Balance Rules renders the surplus more procyclical. 
In terms of Total Primary Expenditure, results confirm previous conclusions. 
Results evidence that the electoral coefficient is positive and highly statistically 
significant when BBR=0, whereas when BBR=1 there is no discernible electoral effect. 
Thus, countries without BBR are more prone to expenditure political cycles. In contrast 
with previous results (Table 4a), Real GDP Growth plays a bigger role in total 
expenditure when Budget Balance Rules are not in place. Apparently, in the absence of 
fiscal rules, expenditures react more to stabilize cycle phases. 
Regarding Total Revenue, there is still no evident electoral effect. Considering 
the fact that there are no electoral effects in this category even when there are no BBR 
and taking the previous results into consideration, we might have another indication that 
Expenditures are the preferred way of inducing electoral cycles. 
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Table 5a – Balanced Budget Rules 
 I II III 
 BBR=1 BBR=0 BBR=1 BBR=0 BBR=1 BBR=0 
ELE1 
-0.1070 
(-0.287304) 
0.3442 
(0.885892) 
0.0039 
(1.276280) 
0.0096*** 
(2.736080) 
-0.0010 
(-0.458429) 
0.0029 
(0.905711) 
GPD_GDP(-1) 
-0.4672 
(-0.522393) 
-0.2993 
(-0.810635) 
-0.0049 
(-0.549242) 
-0.0030 
(-1.521455) 
0.0055 
(1.090305) 
0.0026 
(0.810193) 
FV (-1) 
0.7602*** 
(11.70575) 
0.6062*** 
(7.680423) 
0.8745*** 
(26.54663) 
0.7179*** 
(9.262107) 
0.8971*** 
(40.78343) 
0.7591*** 
(7.587373) 
RGDPG 
7.6108 
(0.600181) 
13.211** 
(2.078220) 
-0.1698* 
(-1.755599) 
-0.3077*** 
(-5.556913) 
-0.0036 
(-0.041724) 
-0.2554*** 
(-3.696244) 
ΔDEPRATIO 
-96.811*** 
(-2.708347) 
39.478 
(0.567121) 
-0.6273 
(-1.569637) 
0.4302 
(0.920449) 
-0.5797* 
(-1.968920) 
0.0333 
(0.062547) 
No. 
Observations 
89 121 94 128 94 128 
Cross-sections 
included 
9 11 9 11 9 11 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.7430 0.6246 0.9057 0.9519 0.9596 0.9481 
F-statistic 13.1161 14.3094 31.01 82.0953 106.1122 75.8994 
Fixed Effects Period Cross-section Period Both Period Both 
* - significant at 10%, ** - significant at 5%, *** - significant at 1%. 
Notes: I – Net Lending, II – Total Primary Expenditure, III – Total Revenue. 
Debt Rules 
Results in Table 5b, below, show, as expected, that there is no significant 
electoral effect in Net Lending (regression I). Interestingly, even though it is expected 
that GPD would have a significant effect when Debt Rules are in place, we would also 
expect this to be true (albeit in a less significant matter) when there are no Debt Rules. 
Surprisingly, there is no statistically significant GPD effect when DR=0. Further, results 
indicate that when Debt Rules exist, Dependency Ratio variation is also statistically 
significant.  
There are electoral effects present in both samples as regards Total Expenditure 
(see regression II, Table 5b). This effect is higher when Debt Rules exist (although less 
statistically significant), which indicates that the mere presence of Debt Rules is not 
sufficient to deter political budget manipulation and electoral expenditure cycles. As 
with previous estimations, Real GDP Growth and Dependency Ratio variation have a 
much greater effect on expenditure when fiscal rules are present. 
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Again, there are no electoral effects in Total Revenue.  
 
Table 5b – Debt Rules 
 I II III 
 DR=1 DR=0 DR=1 DR=0 DR=1 DR=0 
ELE1 
-0.2146 
(-0.495432) 
0.2045 
(0.661209) 
0.0139** 
(2.578677) 
0.0068*** 
(2.690491) 
-0.0029 
(-0.269592) 
0.0013 
(0.587060) 
GPD_GDP(-1) 
11.3719*** 
(3.313531) 
-0.3548 
(-1.061045) 
0.0815 
(1.694535) 
3.74E-05 
(0.110841) 
0.0004 
(0.008787) 
0.0017 
(0.541036) 
FV (-1) 
0.3828*** 
(3.470423) 
0.5576*** 
(7.466483) 
0.5264** 
(3.117461) 
0.8936*** 
(30.25819) 
0.5853** 
(2.266340) 
0.8966*** 
(13.76605) 
RGDPG 
0.2550 
(0.047008) 
2.9190 
(0.376100) 
-0.4374*** 
(-9.127691) 
-0.2568*** 
(-3.964135) 
-0.3705*** 
(-3.452584) 
-0.1804** 
(-2.484273) 
ΔDEPRATIO 
-488.2719*** 
(-4.762378) 
24.4049 
(0.530611) 
6.501*** 
(3.254278) 
0.0307 
(0.136976) 
-0.3022 
(-0.116182) 
0.0731 
(0.215978) 
No. 
Observations 
17 193 17 205 17 205 
Cross-sections 
included 
2 14 2 14 2 14 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.8674 0.6874 0.8579 0.9416 0.4509 0.9566 
F-statistic 21.9303 13.4167 17.1035 157.6010 3.6282 133.0740 
Fixed Effects None Both Cross-section Period None Both 
* - significant at 10%, ** - significant at 5%, *** - significant at 1%. 
Notes: I – Net Lending, II – Total Primary Expenditure, III – Total Revenue. 
Expenditure Rules 
Overall, as can be observed in Table 5c, virtually all expenditure categories have 
significant electoral effects (except for Gross Fixed Capital Formation) when 
Expenditure Rules are not present. The highest effects are in Social Transfers and 
Employee Compensation, and we can conclude that these are the most 
“visible”/important expenditure categories to voters. However, when Expenditure Rules 
are present, the electoral effect disappears, indicating some level of discipline 
effectiveness in these categories. 
In contrast with BBR or DR, the countercyclicality of expenditures is larger 
when expenditure fiscal rules are present. Further, as expected, the variation in 
Dependency Ratio is highly significant in the Social Transfers category, but also only 
when expenditure rules are present. 
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Table 5c – Expenditure Rules 
 II IV V 
 ER=1 ER=0 ER=1 ER=0 ER=1 ER=0 
ELE1 
0.0022 
(0.547988) 
0.0101*** 
(3.000129) 
0.0005 
(0.652477) 
0.0004 
(0.772005) 
0.0005 
(0.925226) 
0.0014** 
(1.983372) 
GPD_GDP(-1) 
-0.0339 
(-0.679227) 
0.0004 
(1.104695) 
-0.0216 
(-1.232746) 
-0.0001 
(-0.090293) 
-0.0023 
(-0.354214) 
4.65E-05 
(0.421032) 
FV (-1) 
0.8275*** 
(7.376903) 
0.9332*** 
(42.08742) 
0.5125*** 
(3.754788) 
0.8016*** 
(14.23706) 
0.7944*** 
(10.33494) 
0.9538*** 
(32.88046) 
RGDPG 
-0.4244*** 
(-6.194421) 
-0.2009** 
(-2.347515) 
-0.0527*** 
(-3.560414) 
0.0042 
(0.265558) 
-0.0332*** 
(-4.823267) 
-0.0151 
(-0.838149) 
ΔDEPRATIO 
-1.0356 
(-1.346984) 
0.2225 
(0.893347) 
-0.2442 
(-1.285744) 
0.0974 
(1.068873) 
-0.0497 
(-0.710981) 
-0.0725 
(-1.021733) 
No. 
Observations 
86 136 86 136 86 136 
Cross-sections 
included 
8 12 8 12 8 12 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.9383 0.9555 0.9045 0.8674 0.9877 0.9256 
F-statistic 47.1973 581.1501 68.0796 56.212 244.6261 336.9122 
Fixed Effects Both None Cross-section Cross-section Both None 
 VI VII  
 ER=1 ER=0 ER=1 ER=0   
ELE1 
-9.64E-05 
(1.068873) 
0.0032*** 
(2.767775) 
0.0001 
(0.368067) 
0.0033*** 
(2.706137) 
  
GPD_GDP(-1) 
-0.0197** 
(1.068873) 
7.96E-05 
(0.727662) 
0.0017 
(0.240408 
-0.0002 
(-0.207921) 
  
FV (-1) 
0.8945*** 
(1.068873) 
0.9447*** 
(64.07846) 
1.0047*** 
(22.92168) 
0.888*** 
(27.38417) 
  
RGDPG 
-0.1562*** 
(1.068873) 
-0.1162*** 
(-3.955990) 
-0.0807*** 
(-9.487058 
-0.0547 
(-1.389155) 
  
ΔDEPRATIO 
-0.4910*** 
(1.068873) 
0.1506 
(1.384700) 
-0.1044 
(-1.616123) 
0.1578 
(0.924753) 
  
No. 
Observations 
86 136 86 136   
Cross-sections 
included 
8 12 8 12   
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.9916 0.9731 0.9951 0.9425   
F-statistic 361.2427 976.8467 614.4772 139.2969   
Fixed Effects Both None Both Cross-section   
Note: II – Total Primary Expenditure, IV – Gross Fixed Capital Formation, V – Intermediate 
Consumption, VI – Social Transfers, VII – Employee Compensation. 
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Revenue Rules 
Revenue regressions in general show no sign of electoral manipulation, with or 
without Revenue Rules (Table 5d). The exception is the category of Direct Taxes – 
highly visible – which displays electoral manipulation when Revenue Rules are absent 
but, even so, the effect is only statistically significant at 10%. However, this is not 
necessarily an indication of rule enforcement; this outcome could also be due to lack of 
government interest in revenue manipulation in favor of the previously mentioned 
preference for political manipulation of expenditures. 
Real GDP Growth displays a negative effect on total revenue only when 
Revenue Rules do not exist. However, it displays significant negative effects, either 
with or without Revenue Rules in Indirect Taxes and Social Contributions Received. 
This variable does not display significant impact in Direct Taxes. The change in the 
Dependency Ratio is only statistically significant in Direct Taxes, but only in the 
presence of Revenue Rules.  
 
Table 5d – Revenue Rules 
 III VIII IX 
 RR=1 RR=0 RR=1 RR=0 RR=1 RR=0 
ELE1 
0.0005 
(0.127924) 
0.0002 
(0.099206) 
-0.0017 
(-0.688946) 
-0.0023* 
(-1.743447) 
0.0002 
(0.677812) 
0.0003 
(0.373860) 
GPD_GDP(-1) 
-0.1388 
(-1.717548) 
-0.0002 
(-0.526655) 
-0.0174 
(-0.522858) 
0.0001 
(0.597252) 
-0.0091 
(-4.103285) 
0.0010 
(0.890310) 
FV (-1) 
0.8458*** 
(7.643100) 
0.9169*** 
(36.58437) 
0.3147* 
(1.939011) 
0.9572*** 
(41.94131) 
1.0104*** 
(38.96475) 
0.9962*** 
(36.90281) 
RGDPG 
-0.1214 
(-0.896192) 
-0.1975*** 
(-3.249138) 
-0.0460 
(-0.722117) 
-0.0524 
(-1.628943) 
-0.095** 
(-5.143708) 
-0.0383* 
(-1.738013) 
ΔDEPRATIO 
-2.5632 
(-0.512237) 
-0.2375 
(-0.911887) 
-5.7882** 
(-2.492289) 
-0.1769 
(-1.449014) 
1.3679 
(2.597819) 
0.0833 
(0.628223) 
No. 
Observations 
21 201 21 201 21 201 
Cross-sections 
included 
3 14 3 14 3 14 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.9489 0.9590 0.9424 0.9443 0.9995 0.9403 
F-statistic 54.1074 223.8692 47.7196 162.4463 2268.882 176.0373 
Fixed Effects 
Cross-section 
(0.1531) 
Period Cross-section Period Period Cross-section 
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 X   
 RR=1 RR=0     
ELE1 
0.0002 
(0.677812) 
0.001 
(1.334664) 
    
GPD_GDP(-1) 
-0.0091* 
(-4.103285) 
-0.0004 
(-0.722280) 
    
FV (-1) 
1.0104*** 
(38.96475) 
0.9113*** 
(39.51491) 
    
RGDPG 
-0.095** 
(-5.143708) 
-0.0763*** 
(-5.011480) 
    
ΔDEPRATIO 
1.3679 
(2.597819) 
0.0720 
(0.654622) 
    
No. 
Observations 
21 201     
Cross-sections 
included 
3 14     
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.9995 0.9843     
F-statistic 2268.882 697.2155     
Fixed Effects Period Cross-section     
Note: III – Total Revenue, VIII – Direct Taxes, IX – Indirect Taxes, X – Social Contributions. 
 
3.4.5.2. The role of alternative fiscal rules – a dummy variable 
approach 
In a second approach we still intend to study the relationship between the 
presence of the different types of fiscal rules and the presence of political budget-
composition cycles. We used the same baseline regressions as for the previous analyses, 
excluding FRI terms, and now including interaction terms between the electoral dummy 
and the alternative fiscal rules dummies. This is applied to the full sample. The 
regression was thus as follows: 
 
                                                       
                                          
 (3.3) 
 
As before, the methodology used was the Fixed Effects Model. For most of the 
estimations we include 14 countries and 222 observations. The exception was the 
estimation using Net Lending as the fiscal indicator which only has 210 observations. 
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The type of fixed effects present in each estimation is discriminated in Tables 6a and 
6b. All remaining relevant information regarding these estimations can also be found in 
the tables. 
Overall, results show that there are no relevant interactions found between most 
of the considered fiscal rules and election years, which is another strong indication that 
the alternative types of quantitative rules are, per se, insufficient to control political 
incentives. However, and reinforcing previous results, the presence of expenditure rules 
is significant in reducing political pressures in expenditures, namely in Social Transfers 
and Employee Compensation. In both these categories there is a positive electoral effect 
(as expected by literature) and the interaction term with the Expenditure Rule 
counteracts this effect (see estimated coefficients of ELE1*ER, regressions VI and VII). 
Thus, there is some effectiveness in Expenditure Rules when dealing with these 
categories in particular. These results on expenditure rules are robust since we reach the 
same conclusions in the first approach. Also, we still find no evidence of political cycle 
on the revenue side. 
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Table 6a – Fiscal rule types and effectiveness 
 I II III IV V 
ELE1 
0.7693* 
(1.673446) 
0.0106*** 
(2.694638) 
0.0012 
(0.371340) 
-8.77E-05 
(-0.132142) 
0.0017** 
(2.196291 
GPD_GDP(-1) 
-0.3406 
(-1.022639) 
-0.0042* 
(-1.772182) 
-0.0002 
(-0.545533) 
-0.0009 
(-0.870306) 
0.0003 
(0.461939) 
FV (-1) 
0.6146*** 
(8.935847) 
0.8413*** 
(17.36880) 
0.9143*** 
(36.03493) 
0.8298*** 
(18.17810) 
0.7948*** 
(15.55879) 
RGDPG 
2.3796 
(0.378160) 
-0.3509*** 
(-6.589213) 
-0.2047*** 
(-3.573584) 
-0.0297** 
(-2.416954) 
-0.0309*** 
(-3.052391) 
ΔDEPRATIO 
17.798 
(0.378614) 
0.4941 
(1.256976) 
-0.2389 
(-0.928095) 
0.0929 
(1.317395) 
0.0374 
(0.477337) 
ELE1*DR 
0.1170 
(0.103462) 
0.0076 
(0.719557) 
0.0034 
(0.288760) 
0.0005 
(0.315591) 
0.0013 
(0.818234) 
ELE1*ER 
-0.0322 
(-0.048222) 
-0.0053 
(-1.018703) 
-0.003 
(-0.610071) 
-0.0001 
(-0.104794) 
-0.0004 
(-0.431774) 
ELE1*BBR 
-0.7106 
(-1.241684) 
-0.004 
(-0.845668) 
0.0002 
(0.049718) 
0.0005 
(0.531202) 
-0.0013 
(-1.475908) 
ELE1*RR 
-1.5702 
(-1.637652) 
-0.0036 
(-0.748409) 
-0.0033 
(-0.785200) 
0.0011 
(1.060768) 
-0.0009 
(-1.168593) 
Adjusted –
Squared 
0.6636 0.9502 0.9588 0.8686 0.9575 
F-statistic 11.8488 111.9781 206.9161 67.3936 131.9445 
Fixed Effects Both Both Period Cross-section Both 
* - significant at 10%, ** - significant at 5%, *** - significant at 1%. 
Note: I – Net Lending, II – Total Primary Expenditure, III – Total Revenue, IV – Capital Formation, V – 
Intermediate Consumption. 
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Table 6b – Fiscal rule types and effectiveness (Continuation) 
 VI VII VIII IX X 
ELE1 
0.0032** 
(2.328082) 
0.0027* 
(1.959294) 
-0.002 
(-1.155450) 
-0.0004 
(-0.279806) 
0.0015 
(1.583692) 
GPD_GDP(-1) 
-0.0008 
(-1.237996) 
-0.0010 
(-1.556068) 
0.0001 
(0.675866) 
0.0009 
(0.824403) 
-0.0004 
(-0.665416) 
FV (-1) 
0.9359*** 
(45.37185) 
0.9087*** 
(31.99743) 
0.9595*** 
(43.07077) 
0.9925*** 
(38.32425) 
0.9063*** 
(39.53113) 
RGDPG 
-0.1550*** 
(-8.533649) 
-0.0788*** 
(-4.511558) 
-0.0564** 
(-2.032764) 
-0.0421 
(-2.012808) 
-0.0720*** 
(-4.757762) 
ΔDEPRATIO 
0.1739 
(1.321247) 
0.1487 
(1.636727) 
-0.1893 
(-1.562230) 
0.0806 
(0.630022) 
0.0714 
(0.637184) 
ELE1*DR 
0.0008 
(0.255426) 
0.0038 
(1.356737) 
-0.0013 
(-0.213756) 
0.0023 
(0.869388) 
0.001 
(0.353223) 
ELE1*ER 
-0.0026* 
(-1.779099) 
-0.0020* 
(-1.652425) 
-0.0010 
(-0.388967) 
-0.0004 
(-0.231723) 
-0.0018 
(-1.264137) 
ELE1*BBR 
-0.0002 
(-0.172119) 
-0.0002 
(-0.140210) 
0.0008 
(0.345166) 
0.0014 
(0.968032) 
0.0001 
(0.100667) 
ELE1*RR 
-0.0006 
(-0.330513) 
-4.84E-05 
(-0.041067) 
-0.0032 
(-0.985511) 
-0.0008 
(-0.522984) 
0.0031 
(1.560459) 
      
Adjusted –Squared 0.9755 0.9575 0.94201 0.9433 0.9834 
F-statistic 401.4840 227.5765 144.6023 167.9842 594.2782 
Fixed Effects Cross-section Cross-section Period Cross-section Cross-section 
* - significant at 10%, ** - significant at 5%, *** - significant at 1%. 
Note: VI – Social Transfers, VII – Employee Compensation, VIII – Direct Taxes, IX – Indirect Taxes, X 
– Social Contributions Received. 
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4. Conclusions 
This work was developed with the clear intention of answering three specific 
questions: Given restraints such as fiscal rules and the incentives of governments to 
secure reelection, will governments manipulate budget composition at a disaggregated 
level? Which budget categories will be targeted to alter the composition of the budget 
without violating fiscal rules? Are there certain types of fiscal rules more efficient than 
others in deterring governments from incurring in fiscal cycles? Even though the 
literature is relatively undivided regarding the existence of electorally induced cycles, 
evidence concerning their manifestation in terms of magnitude, target budget categories, 
and reasons behind their existence is somewhat widespread. 
In order to attempt to answer these questions we opted for an econometric 
analysis with a data panel of 14 Economic and Monetary Union Member States 
covering the period of 1991-2007. Considering 3 levels of budget disaggregation, ten 
regressions were estimated: (1) Net Lending, (2) Total Primary Expenditure and Total 
Revenue, and (3) Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Intermediate Consumption, Social 
Transfers, Employee Compensation, Indirect Taxes, Direct Taxes, and Social 
Contributions Received. Further, we re-ran these regressions comparing regressions 
with and without specific types of fiscal rules: Budget Balance Rules, Revenue Rules, 
Expenditure Rules, and Debt Rule. Also, other regressions were ran controlling for 
those four different types of Fiscal Rules in interaction with the electoral dummy.   
A first relevant finding was the fact that there was no evidence of an electoral 
effect regarding Net Lending, as foreseen by literature. Literature suggests that the 
absence of budget cycles at this level would be due to the existence of Budget Balance 
Rules that inhibit the accumulation of high deficits. However, several authors largely 
agree that the existing fiscal rules have been unsuccessful in preventing these cycles. In 
this regression, the fiscal rules variable was equally insignificant, suggesting once more 
the lack of compliance with the existing fiscal rules, or an absence of efficient and 
preventive fiscal rules.   
Secondly, as expected, evidence not only showed significant signs of electoral 
cycles in Total Primary Expenditure and Total Revenue but also that the effect in terms 
of Expenditures is far greater than in terms of Revenue. This is visible both at an 
aggregate and disaggregate level. 
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Disaggregating Total Expenditure the regressions show that all categories 
display some level of electoral cycles (except for Gross Fixed Capital Formation) and 
that these cycles are highest in “visible” categories such as Social Transfers and 
Employee Compensation, as anticipated. It is worth mentioning that even though the 
fiscal rules indicator does not display significant effects on its own in these categories 
(except in Social Transfers), it does help mitigate (accentuate) the electoral effect when 
its value is high (low) enough. In terms of Revenue, only Direct Taxes display a 
negative electoral effect. 
The Fiscal Rules Index accentuates the effect of several control variables, such 
as Gross Public Debt and Real GDP Growth, in several regressions, but only presents 
individual significance in a few fiscal categories (Total Primary Expenditure, Social 
Transfers, Indirect Taxes and Social Contributions). 
In conclusion, these results reinforce the existing literature suggesting that 
electoral cycles only appear at disaggregated budgetary levels and that the existing 
fiscal rules are insufficient in preventing them. Ideally, fiscal rules should be 
specifically designed to target the different subcategories. This would increase their 
efficiency and specificity and therefore be more successful in preventing fiscal 
manipulation. 
The extended study allowed for a number of interesting conclusions and assured 
the robustness of previously drawn conclusions. The first analysis confirmed the 
hypothesis by which there are no significant cycles in government deficit neither in 
revenue categories. Yet, results showed that countries in this sample are more prone to 
electoral cycles when there are no Budget Balance Rules. Results also indicate that Debt 
and even Expenditure Rules are insufficient in preventing expenditure cycles. 
Furthermore, results indicate a clear electoral preference towards expenditure 
categories. 
Further, our analysis brought more support to the hypothesis by which fiscal 
rules have, in general, been largely ineffective in dealing with budget manipulation for 
electoral purposes but has, however, indicated that even though fiscal rules have not 
been effective, they have some level of effectiveness in the most electorally preferred 
categories (namely, Social Transfers and Employee Compensation). Yet, clearly this 
counter effect has not been sufficient since these are still the most affected categories. 
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The different analyses allowed for the conclusion of the robustness of results, 
particularly in terms of Expenditures. The regressions show that fiscal rules, and 
particularly expenditure rules, seem to enhance the countercyclicality on the 
expenditure side and the reaction on the Expenditures side towards the level of Gross 
Public Debt to GDP. 
The empirical analysis would have benefitted greatly if it would have been 
possible to study the impact of the disaggregated Fiscal Rule Index but data restrictions 
were inhibitive. This would have allowed for a clearer picture of what fiscal aspects 
play a more prominent role, which eventually could benefit future law development. 
Further, our data set was greatly limited due to the fact that the FRI only exists since 
1990, while the other variables covered a greater period of time. This study also 
presented some limitations in terms of uncorrected reverse causality problems which 
limited the interpretation of the data. 
In answer to the questions that guided the development of this thesis, our 
findings suggest that governments will manipulate the budget composition in spite of 
the existence of fiscal rules. There are specific categories that are preferred over others 
by governments (Social Transfers, Employee Compensation and Direct Taxes). As 
became evident in all analyses performed in this thesis, fiscal rules are not particularly 
effective, in general, electorally speaking. However, it is noteworthy that Expenditure 
Rules are significant when it comes to reducing political pressures in categories such as 
Social Transfers and Employee Compensation. In both cases, Expenditure Rules were 
effective in reducing the electoral effect present, which is a fact worth mentioning.  
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Annexes 
Annex I – Data sources and units 
Variable Unit Source 
Election indicator Dummy Database of Political 
Institutions – World 
Bank 
Fiscal  variables Percentage of GDP AMECO 
FRI Fiscal Rule Index European Commission 
Gross Public Debt Percentage of GDP (excessive deficit 
procedure) 
AMECO 
Real GDP growth Percentage AMECO 
Dependency Ratio 
Fiscal rule types 
Percentage of active population 
Dummies 
AMECO  
Nerlich and Reuter 
(2013) 
   
Note: All data regarding Germany (except for demographic variables) is constructed by compiling data 
on West-Germany until 1990 with data on Germany from this point on. 
 
Annex IIa – Series statistics 
 
I II III IV V 
 Mean  0.325959  0.374178  0.377309  0.024925  0.044666 
 Median  0.171196  0.371749  0.392621  0.022873  0.041941 
 Maximum  9.870557  0.875838  0.858310  0.072436  0.147446 
 Minimum -10.46818  0.059672  0.062149  0.007510  0.006373 
 Std. Dev.  3.015968  0.142919  0.140706  0.011000  0.022307 
 Skewness -0.075710  0.157299  0.021665  1.292846  1.064087 
 Kurtosis  3.857189  3.252625  3.258780  5.405713  5.590899 
      
 Jarque-Bera  14.90144  3.262603  1.379756  249.9849  225.3060 
 Probability  0.000581  0.195675  0.501637  0.000000  0.000000 
      
 Sum  153.8524  179.9797  181.4857  11.98886  21.48447 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  4284.246  9.804436  9.503105  0.058080  0.238857 
      
 Observations  472  481  481  481  481 
 
Note: I – Net Lending, II – Total Primary Expenditure, III – Total Revenue, IV – Capital Formation, V – 
Intermediate Consumption 
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Annex IIb – Series statistics (Continuation) 
 
 VI VII VIII IX X 
 Mean  0.131471  0.097704  0.106822  0.110404  0.113300 
 Median  0.127358  0.094943  0.106979  0.113211  0.115216 
 Maximum  0.322944  0.198777  0.293029  0.260982  0.245183 
 Minimum  0.015606  0.016084  0.013428  0.013818  0.016821 
 Std. Dev.  0.055968  0.037140  0.047829  0.043285  0.048364 
 Skewness  0.279120  0.165542  0.520996  0.097486  0.113046 
 Kurtosis  3.049674  2.674012  3.878909  3.003614  2.324807 
      
 Jarque-Bera  6.295058  4.326685  37.24202  0.762122  10.16119 
 Probability  0.042958  0.114940  0.000000  0.683136  0.006216 
      
 Sum  63.23775  46.99565  51.38126  53.10432  54.49737 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  1.503561  0.662098  1.098074  0.899320  1.122760 
      
 Observations  481  481  481  481  481 
 
Note: VI – Social Transfers, VII – Employee Compensation, VIII – Direct Taxes, IX – Indirect Taxes, X 
– Social Contributions Received 
 
Annex IIc – Correlation matrix 
 
 ELE1 GPD_GDP RGDPG ΔDEPRATIO NLEND G_TOT_I_GDP T_TOT_GDP 
ELE1 1,000 -0,040 -0,007 0,012 0,049 0,029 0,000 
GPD_GDP -0,040 1,000 0,018 -0,242 0,059 -0,095 -0,172 
RGDPG -0,007 0,018 1,000 -0,289 0,240 -0,430 -0,320 
DEPRATIO-
DEPRATIO(-1) 
0,012 -0,242 -0,289 1,000 -0,246 0,348 0,254 
NLEND 0,049 0,059 0,240 -0,246 1,000 -0,261 -0,197 
G_TOT_I_GDP 0,029 -0,095 -0,430 0,348 -0,261 1,000 0,923 
T_TOT_GDP 0,000 -0,172 -0,320 0,254 -0,197 0,923 1,000 
CF_GDP -0,001 0,187 -0,125 -0,140 -0,099 0,326 0,247 
INTC_GDP 0,050 0,026 -0,215 0,245 -0,200 0,614 0,586 
TR_GDP 0,017 -0,200 -0,421 0,408 -0,217 0,899 0,866 
W_GDP 0,026 0,376 -0,325 0,074 -0,172 0,635 0,532 
TI_GDP -0,025 0,124 -0,244 0,003 -0,145 0,772 0,793 
TD_GDP -0,039 -0,087 -0,171 0,124 -0,216 0,699 0,841 
SOC_GDP 0,035 -0,448 -0,310 0,398 -0,089 0,688 0,726 
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 CF_GDP INTC_GDP TR_GDP W_GDP TI_GDP TD_GDP SOC_GDP 
ELE1 -0,001 0,050 0,017 0,026 -0,025 -0,039 0,035 
GPD_GDP 0,187 0,026 -0,200 0,376 0,124 -0,087 -0,448 
RGDPG -0,125 -0,215 -0,421 -0,325 -0,244 -0,171 -0,310 
ΔDEPRATIO -0,140 0,245 0,408 0,074 0,003 0,124 0,398 
NLEND -0,099 -0,200 -0,217 -0,172 -0,145 -0,216 -0,089 
G_TOT_I_GDP 0,326 0,614 0,899 0,635 0,772 0,699 0,688 
T_TOT_GDP 0,247 0,586 0,866 0,532 0,793 0,841 0,726 
CF_GDP 1,000 0,308 0,080 0,405 0,465 0,226 -0,095 
INTC_GDP 0,308 1,000 0,415 0,609 0,491 0,477 0,181 
TR_GDP 0,080 0,415 1,000 0,452 0,658 0,639 0,767 
W_GDP 0,405 0,609 0,452 1,000 0,720 0,411 0,073 
TI_GDP 0,465 0,491 0,658 0,720 1,000 0,627 0,337 
TD_GDP 0,226 0,477 0,639 0,411 0,627 1,000 0,419 
SOC_GDP -0,095 0,181 0,767 0,073 0,337 0,419 1,000 
 
Annex IId – Existence of different types of fiscal rules over time 
 
 BBR DR ER RR 
Austria (1999-2012) - - - 
Belgium (1982-2012) - (1993-1998) (1995-1999) 
Cyprus - - - - 
Finland (1995-2012) (1995-2007) (2003-2012) - 
France (1983-2012) (2008-2012) (1997-2012) (2006-2012) 
Germany (1969-2012) - (1982-2012) - 
Greece - - - - 
Ireland (2004-2012) - (2000-2012) - 
Italy (2001-2012) - (1999-2012) - 
Luxembourg - (2004-2012) (1990-2012) - 
Malta - - - - 
the Netherlands - - (1994-2012) (1994-2012) 
Portugal (2002-2012) - (2012) - 
Spain (2003-2012) - (2011-2012) - 
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Annex III – Hausman Tests  
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ_NLEND   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 0.000000 10 1.0000 
     
      
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ_G_TOT_I_GDP   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 0.000000 10 1.0000 
     
      
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ_T_TOT_GDP   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 0.000000 10 1.0000 
     
      
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ_CF_GDP   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 0.000000 10 1.0000 
     
      
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ_INTC_GDP   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 0.000000 10 1.0000 
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Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ_TR_GDP   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 0.000000 10 1.0000 
     
      
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ_W_GDP   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 0.000000 10 1.0000 
     
      
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ_TD_GDP   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 0.000000 10 1.0000 
     
      
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ_TI_GDP   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 0.000000 10 1.0000 
     
      
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ_SOC_GDP   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 0.000000 10 1.0000 
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Annex IV – Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ_NLEND   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 2.044929 (13,170) 0.0199 
Cross-section Chi-square 30.511279 13 0.0040 
Period F 1.808557 (16,170) 0.0334 
Period Chi-square 33.009752 16 0.0074 
Cross-Section/Period F 2.002642 (29,170) 0.0034 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 61.715476 29 0.0004 
     
      
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ_G_TOT_I_GDP   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 2.021362 (13,182) 0.0212 
Cross-section Chi-square 29.940174 13 0.0048 
Period F 2.273972 (16,182) 0.0048 
Period Chi-square 40.458661 16 0.0007 
Cross-Section/Period F 2.372611 (29,182) 0.0003 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 71.189180 29 0.0000 
     
      
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ_T_TOT_GDP   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 0.946391 (13,182) 0.5064 
Cross-section Chi-square 14.521587 13 0.3382 
Period F 1.798054 (16,182) 0.0342 
Period Chi-square 32.579707 16 0.0084 
Cross-Section/Period F 1.532947 (29,182) 0.0492 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 48.516247 29 0.0130 
     
      
 
  
 76 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ_CF_GDP   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 2.799035 (13,182) 0.0011 
Cross-section Chi-square 40.462637 13 0.0001 
Period F 0.596477 (16,182) 0.8840 
Period Chi-square 11.346186 16 0.7876 
Cross-Section/Period F 1.629813 (29,182) 0.0292 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 51.253151 29 0.0066 
     
      
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ_INTC_GDP   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 1.996930 (13,182) 0.0232 
Cross-section Chi-square 29.601363 13 0.0054 
Period F 1.543411 (16,182) 0.0888 
Period Chi-square 28.246291 16 0.0295 
Cross-Section/Period F 1.673559 (29,182) 0.0229 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 52.478195 29 0.0048 
     
      
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ_TR_GDP   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 3.056307 (13,182) 0.0004 
Cross-section Chi-square 43.836725 13 0.0000 
Period F 1.460443 (16,182) 0.1188 
Period Chi-square 26.815901 16 0.0436 
Cross-Section/Period F 2.329942 (29,182) 0.0004 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 70.091164 29 0.0000 
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Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ_W_GDP   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 3.198267 (13,182) 0.0002 
Cross-section Chi-square 45.676793 13 0.0000 
Period F 1.194209 (16,182) 0.2762 
Period Chi-square 22.162730 16 0.1380 
Cross-Section/Period F 2.259057 (29,182) 0.0006 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 68.255014 29 0.0001 
     
      
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ_TD_GDP   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 1.520286 (13,182) 0.1135 
Cross-section Chi-square 22.886109 13 0.0431 
Period F 3.217340 (16,182) 0.0001 
Period Chi-square 55.295481 16 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period F 2.152028 (29,182) 0.0013 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 65.453493 29 0.0001 
     
      
 
Equation: EQ_TI_GDP   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 2.260955 (13,182) 0.0089 
Cross-section Chi-square 33.235511 13 0.0016 
Period F 1.253739 (16,182) 0.2317 
Period Chi-square 23.211688 16 0.1082 
Cross-Section/Period F 1.813959 (29,182) 0.0102 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 56.364845 29 0.0017 
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Equation: EQ_SOC_GDP   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 2.341613 (13,182) 0.0066 
Cross-section Chi-square 34.333960 13 0.0011 
Period F 1.310785 (16,182) 0.1944 
Period Chi-square 24.212229 16 0.0850 
Cross-Section/Period F 1.822090 (29,182) 0.0097 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 56.587865 29 0.0016 
     
     
 
 
 
 
